Abstract: Hybrid offering is a significant way for Chinese equipment manufacturers to achieve the goal of service-oriented manufacturing transformation. In this process, manufacturers take service derivatives as the measure and match equipment products and derivative services to meet customer needs. However, the performance of hybrid offerings is influenced by different targets and actions from manufacturers, governments and customers. Accordingly, this study first clarifies their conflicts and interactions. On this basis, a three-party evolutionary game model is established. Finally, based on the model, a simulation method of system dynamics is used to analyze the changing rules under different agents' action strategies and parameters. The results show that if the servitization level is high, even without the participaton of governments, only the other two parties could achieve an iedal stability, but if the servitization level is low, all three parties have to participate to release the value of hybrid offering. Besides, in this offering process, governments should adopt "push-pull" method, develop appropriate incentive and mandatory penalty policies and set up interactive platforms; manufacturers should provide customers with higher-value-added services and highlight the potential loss of customers who don't buy hybrid offering; and customers should avoid falling into short-sighted mindset and actively join interactive activities. In this way, individual interests and value co-creation could be coordinated.

Key words: service-oriented manufacturing, hybrid offerings, service derivatives, evolutionary game, system dynamics