Management Review ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (8): 263-277.

• Accounting and Financial Management • Previous Articles     Next Articles

The Discounted Value of Accounts Receivables in State-owned Enterprises: Evidence and Mechanism Explanation

Ying Qianwei1, Liu Jinsong2   

  1. 1. School of Business, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610064;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084
  • Received:2018-07-09 Online:2021-08-28 Published:2021-09-04

Abstract: Using non-state-owned listed companies as a benchmark, this paper estimates the market value of the accounts receivable of the state-owned listed companies in China. We find that SOEs' accounts receivables in China do have significantly lower market value and lower quality than these of non-SOEs. Further, we provide evidence that low market value of accounts receivables for SOEs is attributed to the severer agency problems in SOEs. We find that the value of accounts receivables is significantly lower in SOEs with lower supervision from audits, with lower proportion of non-state-owned shares, with CEO duality, and with more media coverage, as well as with lower proportion of institutional investor shares. Also, we find the value of accounts receivables is significantly lower in SOEs with lower relative monetary compensation and with lower management shareholding proportion. Based on perspective of accounts receivables, our paper provides new evidences of the agency conflicts, and provides new enlightenments for the anti-corruption and regulation of SOEs.

Key words: accounts receivables, agency conflicts, firm value