Management Review ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (4): 147-159.

• E-business and Information Management • Previous Articles     Next Articles

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysison Embedded Risk Controlling in B2C Network Platform

Peng Zhengyin1, Wang Yongqing2, Han Jingwen3   

  1. 1. School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222;
    2. School of Accounting, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815;
    3. School of Technology, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222
  • Received:2019-06-28 Online:2021-04-28 Published:2021-05-06

Abstract: With the development of B2C network platform, the embedded risks originated from irregularities of embedded merchants, such as “false transaction and credit standing”,“forged and fake commodity”, is becoming more and more obvious. Based on dual embeddedness of merchants and consumers, the interaction of participants’ behavior and limited rationality, an evolutionary game model composed of “network platform-embedded merchants-consumers” is constructed. The asymptotic stability of equilibrium points and the evolutionary stable strategies of the system are analyzed by evolutionary game theory and Lyapunov diagnostic method. The evolution of tripartite behavior strategy is simulated and analyzed by MATLAB. The results show that reducing regulation costs, increasing penalties for irregularities and increasing violation costs can promote the evolution of the system to ideal strategies. Therefore, B2C network platform can control the embedded risks by optimizing algorithms to reduce regulatory costs, establishing a multi-party co-governance system to increase regulatory efforts, increasing violation costs and improving safeguarding rights mechanisms.

Key words: B2C network platform, tripartite evolutionary game, embedded risks, dual embeddedness, simulation