Auction Theory and Design: A Review of the Contributions of the 2020 Nobel Prize Winners in Economics

Abstract

Abstract: This paper briefly reviews the major contributions of Milgrom and Wilson, winners of the 2020 Nobel Prize in Economics, in auction theory and design and its practice. This award is a renewed recognition of fundamental contributions to both theory and practice. The two economists with a solid background in operations research and management science, whose research embodies the distinctive style of pragmatism and truth-seeking and the unity of knowledge and action, are shining examples of the positive interaction between economic theory and practice. The works of the two winners have a big impact on management science and serve as a bridge between management science and economics. We also explore the implications of their works to the development of Chinese economics and management science, and to China's economic development, especially to the question of how to make best use of the market in allocating resources.

Key words: auction theory, auction/market/mechanism design, game theory, economic engineer, operations research and managemen t science

Cao Zhigang, Qiao Han, Yang Zaifu. Auction Theory and Design: A Review of the Contributions of the 2020 Nobel Prize Winners in Economics[J]. Management Review, 2020, 32(10): 3-10.

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