Management Review ›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (9): 266-279.

• Accounting and Financial Management • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Tunneling or Signaling? An Analysis on Big Shareholder Participation and SEO Discount

Wang Huacheng1, Liu Jinzhao2, Gao Shenghao3, Qing Xiaoquan4   

  1. 1. School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872;
    2. School of Business, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048;
    3. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044;
    4. School of Accounting, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070
  • Received:2017-10-25 Online:2020-09-28 Published:2020-09-30

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of big shareholder in SEO pricing under different pricing mechanisms. For SEOs using fixed-price mechanism, the SEO discount is higher when big shareholders get involved and this relation is more pronounced for firms in a poor environment of corporate governance. In contrast, the discount for SEOs employing auction pricing mechanism is lower when big shareholders participate and this relation is stronger for more opaque firms. These results imply that big shareholders tunnel through suppressing offer price only under fixed-price mechanism. In auction pricing mechanism, big shareholder participation releases good signal and thus decreases SEO discount.

Key words: SEO discount, tunneling, fixed-price pricing mechanism, auction pricing mechanism