Can Government-sponsored Venture Capital Promote the Technological Innovation: An Empirical Study of Chinese High-tech Start-up Enterprises

Abstract

Abstract:

As an important promoter of the strategy of innovation-driven development in China, did government-sponsored venture capital (GVC) funds support these high-tech start-up enterprises through different ways to promote their technological innovation level and indirectly improve the rate of technological progress of China? In this paper, we use panel data of GVC investment and corresponding non-public enterprises during 2010-2017 to examine whether GVC can encourage and stimulate high-tech start-up enterprises to conduct technological innovations and the effect difference among different operating patterns. The empirical results show that GVC can promote the high-tech start-up enterprises' technological innovation better than IVC, indirect investment performs better than direct investment in GVC's pattern, joint investment performs better than individual investment, GVC as a leading investor performs better in a joint investment. Therefore, China's GVCs can adopt the indirect investment pattern and serve as a leading investor in the joint investment towards the high-tech start-up enterprises to provide better support for SMEs' technological innovation.

Key words: government-sponsored venture capital, technological innovation, venture capital

Huang Song, Ni Xuanming, Zhang Junchao, Zhao Huimin. Can Government-sponsored Venture Capital Promote the Technological Innovation: An Empirical Study of Chinese High-tech Start-up Enterprises[J]. , 2020, 32(3): 110-121.

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