The Appointment of Non-local Independent Directors in the Circumstance Where Control Is Separated from Ownership

Abstract

Abstract:

By employing sample of listed companies on Chinese main board from 2001-2013, this study explores how the appointment of nonlocal independent directors will be affected by the separation of controlling shareholders' control right and cash flow right. We find, firstly, the higher the separation is, the more nonlocal independent directors the firm would appoint, and the result is robust after controlling multiple endogenous problems; secondly, the consequence of appointing nonlocal independent directors is that when the separation is high, the more nonlocal independent directors a firm hires, the severer the negative effect those directors will exert on the firm's value; moreover, when the large shareholders cannot directly control the board, hiring nonlocal independent directors is an alternative way to do it, meaning in the firms whose important positions of the board are appointed by the large shareholders, the impact that the separation exerts on hiring nonlocal directors is weaker. Additional test shows that, institutions attenuate the effect that the higher the separation is, the more nonlocal independent directors will be enrolled. The results of this study show that hiring nonlocal independent directors is an important way to realize the tunneling behavior of large shareholders, therefore this study not only extends and enriches the researches on how does the separation influence the governance role of the board, but also offers some enlightenments on how to improve the effect of independent directors' performance.

Key words: separation between control and ownership, nonlocal independent directors, firm value

Lin Yan, Cao Chunfang. The Appointment of Non-local Independent Directors in the Circumstance Where Control Is Separated from Ownership[J]. , 2019, 31(3): 211-226.

References

[1] 孙亮,刘春. 公司为什么聘请异地独立董事[J]. 管理世界, 2014,(9):131-142
[2] 刘春,李善民,孙亮. 独立董事具有咨询功能吗?[J]. 管理世界, 2015,(3):124-136
[3] Masulis R. W., Wang C., Xie F. Globalizing the Boardroom:The Effects of Foreign Directors on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2012,(53):527-554
[4] Alam Z. S., Chen M. A., Ciccotello C. S., et al. Does the Location of Directors Matter? Information Acquisition and Board Decisions[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2014,49(1):131-164
[5] 曹春方,林雁. 异地独董、履职职能与公司过度投资[J]. 南开管理评论, 2017,20(1):16-29
[6] Grossman S., Hart O. One Share-one Vote and the Market for Corporate Controls[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,(20):175-202
[7] Shleifer A., Vishny R. W. A Survey of Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Finance, 1997,52(2):737-783
[8] La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., et al. Corporate Ownership Around the World[J]. Journal of Finance, 1999,54(2):471-517
[9] Claessens S., Djankov S., Lang L. P. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000,(58):81-112
[10] 张华,张俊喜,宋敏. 所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2004,3(13):1-14
[11] 王鹏,周黎安. 控股股东的控制权、所有权与公司绩效[J]. 金融研究, 2006,(2):88-98
[12] Fama E. F., Jensen M. C. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983,26(2):301-325
[13] Jensen M. The Modern Industrial Revolution Exit, and Failure of Internal Control Systems[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1993,48(3):831-879
[14] 叶康涛,祝继高,陆正飞,等. 独立董事的独立性:基于董事会投票的证据[J]. 经济研究, 2011,(1):126-139
[15] 田利辉,叶瑶,张伟. 两权分离与上市公司长期回报:利益侵占还是简政释权[J]. 世界经济, 2016,(7):49-71
[16] 冉茂盛,李文洲. 终极控制人的两权分离债务融资与资金侵占基于家族上市公司的样本分析[J]. 管理评论, 2015,27(6):197-208
[17] 王立章,王咏梅,王志诚. 控制权、现金流权与股价同步性[J]. 金融研究, 2016,(5):97-110
[18] 刘志远,靳光辉. 投资者情绪与公司投资效率——基于股东持股比例及两权分离调节作用的实证研究[J]. 管理评论, 2013,25(5):82-91
[19] Fan J. P. H., Wang T. J. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2002,(33):401-425
[20] Leuz C., Nanda D., Wysocki P. D. Earnings Management and Investor Protection:An International Comparison[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003,(69):505-527
[21] 余明桂,夏新平. 控股股东、代理问题与关联交易:对中国上市公司的实证研究[J]. 南开管理评论, 2004,7(6):33-38
[22] 刘峰,贺建刚,魏明海. 控制权、业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究[J]. 管理世界, 2004,(8):102-111
[23] Liu Q., Luo T., Tian G. Family Control and Corporate Cash Holdings:Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015,(31):220-245
[24] Coval J., Moskowitz T. Home Bias at Home:Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios[J]. Journal of Finance, 1999,54(6):2045-2073
[25] Ivkovic Z., Weisbenner S. Local does as Local Is:Information Content of the Geography of Individual Investors' Common Stock Investments[J]. Journal of Finance, 2006,60(1):267-306
[26] Malloy C. The Geography of Equity Analysis[J]. Journal of Finance, 2005,60(2):719-755
[27] Bae K., Stulz R., Tan H. Do Local Analysts Know More? A Cross-country Study of the Performance of Local Analysts and Foreign Analysts[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008,(88):581-606
[28] Uysal V., Kedia S., Panchapagesan V. Geography and Acquirer Returns[J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2008,(17):256-275
[29] Choi J., Kim J., Qiu A., et al. Auditor Locality, Audit Quality and Audit Pricing[DB/OL].http://ssrn.com/abstract=966022,2007
[30] Numan W., Willekens M. An Empirical Test of Spatial Competition in the Audit Market[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2012,53(1-2):450-465
[31] Petersen M. A., Rajan R. Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending[J]. Journal of Finance, 2002,57(6):2533-2570
[32] Knyazeva A., Knyazeva D. Does Being Your Bank's Neighbormatter?[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2012,(36):1194-1209
[33] Lerner J. Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms[J]. Journal of Finance, 1995,50(1):318-320
[34] Tang X., Du J., Hou Q. The Effectiveness of the Mandatory Disclosure of Independent Directors' Opinions:Empirical Evidence From China[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2013,(32):89-125
[35] Knyazeva A., Knyazeva D., Masulis R. The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2013,26(6):1561-1605
[36] Johnson S., LaPorta F., Shleifer A. Tunneling[J]. The American Economic Review, 2000,90(2):22-27
[37] 郑国坚,林东杰,张飞达. 大股东财务困境、掏空与公司治理的有效性——来自大股东财务数据的证据[J]. 管理世界, 2013,(5):157-168
[38] 李凤,董艳. 大股东私有收益对海外上市决策的影响——基于内地赴港上市企业的实证研究[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2016,16(1):415-440
[39] 唐清泉,罗党论,王莉. 大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据[J]. 中国会计评论, 2005,3(1):63-86
[40] 高雷,何少华,黄志忠. 公司治理与掏空[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2006,5(4):1157-1178
[41] 叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华. 独立董事能否抑制大股东的"掏空"[J]. 经济研究, 2007,(4):101-111
[42] 唐跃军,左晶晶. 终极控制权、大股东治理战略与独立董事[J]. 审计研究, 2010,(6):93-99
[43] 唐清泉,罗党论. 设立独立董事的效果分析——来自中国上市公司独立董事的问卷调查[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(1):120-127
[44] 辛清泉,黄曼丽,易浩然. 独立董事监管处罚——基于独立董事个体视角的分析[J]. 管理世界, 2013,(5):131-175
[45] 唐清泉,罗党论,王莉. 大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据[J]. 中国会计评论, 2005,3(1):63-86
[46] Brickley J. A., Zimmerman J. L. Corporate Governance Mmyths:Comments on Armstrong, Guay, and Weber[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2010,50(2/3):235-245
[47] Duchin R., Matsusaka J. G., Ozbas O. When Are Outside Directors Effective[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2010,(2):195-214
[48] 伍中信,肖美英. 信息、产权与博弈:会计监督的经济学[J]. 会计研究, 1997,(12):14-17
[49] Faccio M., Lang L., Young L. Dividends and Expropriation[J]. American Economic Review, 2001,91(1):54-78
[50] Jameson M. Controlling Shareholders, Board Structure, and Firm Performance:Evidence from India[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2014,(27):1-20
[51] He J., Huang Z. Board Informal Hierarchy and Firm Financial Performance:Exploring a Tacit Structure Guiding Boardroom Interactions[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2011,54(6):1119-1139
[52] 武立东,江津,王凯. 董事会成员地位差异、环境不确定性与企业投资行为[J]. 管理科学, 2016,29(2):52-65
[53] 陈晓红,尹哲,吴旭雷. "金字塔结构"、家族控制与企业价值——基于沪深股市的实证分析[J]. 南开管理评论, 2007,10(5):47-54
[54] Yermack D. Higher Market Valuations of Companies With a Small Board of Directors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996,(40):185-211
[55] 李莉,关宇航,顾春霞. 治理监督机制对中国上市公司过度投资行为的影响研究——论代理理论的适用性[J]. 管理评论, 2014,26(5):139-148
[56] 叶勇,刘波,黄雷. 终极控制权、现金流量权与企业价值——基于隐性终极控制论的中国上市公司治理实证研究[J]. 管理科学学报, 2007,(1):66-79
[57] 马磊,徐向艺. 两权分离度与公司治理绩效实证研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2010,(12):108-116
[58] 李维安,钱先航. 终极控制人的两权分离、所有制与经理层治理[J]. 金融研究, 2010,(12):80-98
[59] 李常青,赖建清. 董事会特征影响公司绩效吗[J]. 金融研究, 2004,(5):64-77
[60] 徐晓东,陈小悦. 第一大股东对公司治理、企业绩效的影响分析[J]. 经济研究, 2003,(2):64-74