Multi-period Reputation Effect Model of Governmental Emergency Strategy in Environmental Pollution Incidents

Abstract

Abstract:

In dealing with emergency PX events such as environmental pollution group event, local governments, for the sake of dimen-sional stability, tend to order the trouble-causing project stopped and relocated, but such disposal results in a strong diffusion effect when PX events break out elsewhere. In this paper, a multi cycle reputation effect model of environmental pollution group event of government emergency strategy is constructed, which explains the diffusion effect of PX event under the local government's stability-maintaining strategy. The research shows that in the single-cycle sequential game model of the non-government reputation effect, the local government should not move in advance when the surrounding people adopt a compromise strategy, which will reduce the cost of the local government. Considering the government reputation effect of multi-periodic sequential game model, the local government that orders production stopped will have a reputation effect in the future period (or other areas), not only the local government's expected costs will rise, but the greater the reputation effect, the greater the expected cost of local government.

Key words: environmental pollution group events, reputation effect model, PX event, emergency strategy, multiple periods sequential game

Liu Dehai, Zhao Ning, Zou Huawei. Multi-period Reputation Effect Model of Governmental Emergency Strategy in Environmental Pollution Incidents[J]. , 2018, 30(9): 239-245.

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