Quality Incentives Based on Newsvendor Model under Asymmetric Information

Abstract

Abstract:

This paper studies the quality incentive issue of " supplier-retailer" supply chain with asymmetric information. Based on whether the retailer shares the quality inspection information, the issue is divided into two cases:single moral hazard and double moral hazard. For each case, we design two incentive contracts based on internal or external failures information using principal-agent models. Under single moral hazard, both contracts can achieve the optimal decision of symmetric information, while under double moral hazard, neither of them can achieve the optimal decision. At last, we compare the two quality incentive contracts under double moral hazard with numerical experiment. The results show that the higher quality can be achieved by the contract based on internal failures information under double moral hazard.

Key words: quality incentives, newsvendor model, moral hazard, principal-agent theory

Wang Qian, Xie Chunyu, Cui Yiwen. Quality Incentives Based on Newsvendor Model under Asymmetric Information[J]. , 2018, 30(6): 227-237.

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