Research on Bounded Rationality of Emission-dependent Enterprises Based on Quantal Response Equilibrium

Abstract

Abstract:

This paper designs the 2×2 experiment to study the bounded rationality of emission-dependent enterprises. By quantitatively characterizing the bounded rationality of emission-dependent enterprises under different paid allocation policies of emission permit and comparatively analyzing them, we draw the following conclusions. The pricing strategy of emission permit affects the bounded rationality of enterprises and decisions under high-price strategy are more rational. Whether the allocation method of emission permit affects the bounded rationality of enterprises relates to the pricing strategy. Under the low-price strategy, decisions under the production-dependent allocation policy are more rational than under the emission-dependent allocation policy, while there is not much difference under the high price strategy. Enterprises with different levels of pollution discharge technology have different degrees of bounded rationality. Enterprises with high levels of pollution discharge technology are more rational under the low-price strategy while enterprises with low levels of pollution discharge technology are more rational under the high-price strategy. The bounded rationality parameters of enterprises fluctuate in the range of 52-97. The research provides theoretical support for the rational and effective decision-making of the emission-dependent enterprises and the further improvement of government policies.

Key words: quantal response equilibrium, paid allocation of emission permit, bounded rationality, experiment

Zheng Junjun, Cai Ming, Wang Lu, Wang Xiangmin. Research on Bounded Rationality of Emission-dependent Enterprises Based on Quantal Response Equilibrium[J]. , 2018, 30(6): 173-183.

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