管理评论

›› 2017, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 168-175.

• 组织行为与人力资源管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

高管权力、现金股利政策及其价值效应

张春龙, 张国梁   

  1. 大连理工大学工商管理学院, 大连 116024
  • 收稿日期:2016-04-25 出版日期:2017-03-28 发布日期:2017-03-30
  • 作者简介:张春龙,大连理工大学工商管理学院博士研究生;张国梁,大连理工大学工商管理学院教授,博士生导师。

Managerial Power, Cash Dividend Policy and Value Effect

Zhang Chunlong, Zhang Guoliang   

  1. School of Business Administration, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024
  • Received:2016-04-25 Online:2017-03-28 Published:2017-03-30

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摘要： 现金股利政策一直是学术界关注的热点问题，国内外学者多从代理角度讨论公司发放现金股利的动机，缺乏对动机实现手段的讨论。本文从我国资本市场低现金股利的现实特点出发，研究高管权力对公司现金股利政策的影响以及这种影响的价值效应。研究表明，高管权力显著影响了公司的现金股利政策。随着高管权力的增大，公司现金股利的分配倾向和力度越来越低。进一步的研究发现，高管权力影响了现金股利的边际价值。

关键词: 高管权力, 现金股利政策, 价值效应

Abstract: Cash Dividend Policy is always a hot issue for academic researchers, but most of them analyze the motivations of cash dividends from the view point of agency theory and few researchers emphasize the managerial power, which is the approach to realize the motivations of cash dividends. Based on the fact of the low cash dividends in China's capital market, this paper analyzes the relationship between managerial power and cash dividend policy, and its value effect. It reveals that managerial power has a great effect on the cash dividend policy. With the increase of the managerial power, the inclination and level of cash dividends gets much weaker, the marginal value of cash dividends gets lower.

Key words: managerial power, cash dividend policy, value effect