媒体监督、经理人特征与掏空——基于我国家族上市公司的经验证据

›› 2017, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (2): 155-167.

• 组织行为与人力资源管理 • 上一篇下一篇

媒体监督、经理人特征与掏空——基于我国家族上市公司的经验证据

叶勇, 李明, 王雨潇

西南交通大学经济管理学院, 成都 610031

收稿日期:2014-09-25 出版日期:2017-02-28 发布日期:2017-03-16
作者简介:叶勇,西南交通大学经济管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;李明,西南交通大学经济管理学院博士研究生;王雨潇,西南交通大学经济管理学院硕士研究生。
基金资助:
教育部人文社科基金项目（16YJA630067）；四川省社科规划项目（SC16B118；SC16B086）；西华大学重点科研基金项目（ZW1521534）。

Media Coverage, Managers' Characteristics and Tunneling: Evidence from Chinese Listed Family-owned Companies

Ye Yong, Li Ming, Wang Yuxiao

School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031

Received:2014-09-25 Online:2017-02-28 Published:2017-03-16

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对我国家族上市公司的特点，本文以我国家族上市公司控股股东的掏空行为为切入点，从媒体的视角研究了媒体监督、经理人特征与掏空之间的关系，并验证了声誉机制在其中所发挥的作用。研究发现媒体监督能够抑制家族上市公司控股股东的掏空行为，说明媒体发挥了积极的监督作用，有助于公司治理的完善和中小投资者利益的保护。进一步的研究表明当经理人为职业经理人时媒体监督对掏空的影响较大，且当职业经理人没有在其他单位兼职时媒体监督对掏空的影响较大。表明媒体在影响公司治理时，声誉机制发挥了积极的作用。

关键词: 媒体监督, 经理人特征, 声誉机制, 掏空

Abstract: In view of the characteristics of Chinese listed family-own firms, we take tunneling of controlling shareholders in listed family-owned firms as an entry point to study the relationship among media coverage, managers' characteristics and tunneling from the perspective of media, and we also verify the function of reputation mechanism. The research results show that media coverage can restrain tunneling of controlling shareholders in listed family-owned firms, which means that media plays an important supervision role and contributes to perfecting the corporate governance and protecting the interests of small investors. Further study indicates that when the manager is a professional manager, the influence of media coverage on tunneling is greater, and moreover media coverage has a better effect on restraining tunneling when the manager doesn't hold any post in other institutions. The research findings make it clear that reputation mechanism plays an active role when media influences corporate governance.

Key words: media coverage, managers' characteristics, reputation mechanism, tunneling

叶勇, 李明, 王雨潇. 媒体监督、经理人特征与掏空——基于我国家族上市公司的经验证据[J]. , 2017, 29(2): 155-167.

Ye Yong, Li Ming, Wang Yuxiao. Media Coverage, Managers' Characteristics and Tunneling: Evidence from Chinese Listed Family-owned Companies[J]. , 2017, 29(2): 155-167.

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媒体监督、经理人特征与掏空——基于我国家族上市公司的经验证据

Media Coverage, Managers' Characteristics and Tunneling: Evidence from Chinese Listed Family-owned Companies

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