消费者质量识别对农产品供应链质量和价格决策的影响

›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (12): 225-234.

消费者质量识别对农产品供应链质量和价格决策的影响

古川, 罗峦

湖南农业大学经济学院, 长沙 410128

收稿日期:2015-05-04 出版日期:2016-12-28 发布日期:2017-03-15
作者简介:古川,湖南农业大学经济学院讲师,硕士生导师,博士;罗峦,湖南农业大学经济学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目（71403087）；中国博士后科学基金面上项目（2016M590743）；湖南省自然科学基金青年项目（2015JJ3078）；湖南省哲学社会科学基金一般项目（13YBA166；14YBA194）；湖南农业大学引进人才科学基金（13YJ06）。

The Impact of Consumers' Quality Identification on the Decisions of Quality and Price in an Agricultural Product Supply Chain

Gu Chuan, Luo Luan

Economics College, Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha 410128

Received:2015-05-04 Online:2016-12-28 Published:2017-03-15

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

消费者对农产品质量的识别会影响农业企业的经营决策。本文把农产品市场假设为质量不能被识别和能够被识别的两种情况，应用Stackelberg博弈模型讨论了供应链的质量投入和产品定价，研究表明：质量不能被识别时，质量投入和产品价格受到价格弹性影响，价格敏感时可能形成低质低价的局面；质量可被识别时，质量和定价都随质量识别能力提高而增加，且生产商主导时质量投入和价格较高，而集成决策企业会根据市场规模进行质量投入，此时有益于形成高质高价的良性局面。

关键词: 质量识别, 农产品供应链, 质量投入, 价格制定, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract:

Consumer's perception of the quality of agricultural products in the market will influence the strategies of the upstream enterprises. In this paper, the market is assumed to be under two opposite conditions:one is that agricultural product quality is identifiable and the other unidentifiable. The agricultural products supply chain is divided into three structures depending on the dominant firms and Stackelberg Game Model is used to discuss quality investment and product price. The research reveals that when quality is unidentifiable, the quality investment and product price of the supply chain are affected by the market price elasticity; when quality is identifiable, the quality investment and product price of the supply chain increase with the increase of the quality identification capability, and quality investment and price are relatively high in the producer-driven supply chain, but the integrated decision-making enterprises will make some certain quality investment after careful selection, which can contribute to a benign development of high quality and high price.

Key words: quality identify, agriculture product supply chain, quality investment, price decision, Stackelberg game model

古川, 罗峦. 消费者质量识别对农产品供应链质量和价格决策的影响[J]. , 2016, 28(12): 225-234.

Gu Chuan, Luo Luan. The Impact of Consumers' Quality Identification on the Decisions of Quality and Price in an Agricultural Product Supply Chain[J]. , 2016, 28(12): 225-234.

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