高管身份跨界的“双刃剑”与民营企业成长

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

以我国上市民营企业为样本，对高管身份跨界与民营企业成长之间的关系进行实证研究。得到的结果表明：高管身份跨界范围对民营企业成长有显著的负向影响，而高管身份跨界级别的影响却是正向的，对于民营企业成长而言，高管身份跨界本身就是一把“双刃剑”；当引入调节变量后，结构不确定改变了高管身份跨界范围与民营企业成长之间的作用方向，市场竞争强度增加了高管身份跨界级别与民营企业成长之间作用关系的大小，在二者的显著调节作用下高管身份跨界的“双刃剑”效应消失了；当把研发战略和广告战略引入模型后，高管身份跨界在强化研发战略与民营企业成长之间作用关系的同时，又会弱化广告战略与民营企业成长之间的作用关系，在结构不确定和激烈的市场竞争条件下，如果综合考虑研发战略、广告战略与民营企业成长的关系，高管身份跨界亦是一把“双刃剑”。

关键词: 高管身份跨界, ", 双刃剑", 企业成长, 研发战略, 广告战略

Abstract:

In this paper, we make an empirical study of the relationship between the cross-cutting identity of senior executives and the growth of non-SOEs based on the sample of listed companies in China. The results show that the scope of cross-cutting identity has significantly negative impact on the value of non-SOEs, while the levelof cross-cutting identity is positive. The cross-cutting identity of senior executives is like a double-edged sword. But after moderators being put into model, the double-side effect of the cross-cutting identity disappears. Structural uncertainty and competitive intensity play significantly positive, moderating roles between the cross-cutting identity and the growth of non-SOEs. Under the environment of structural uncertainty and competitive intensity, the cross-cutting identity of senior executives can improve the effectiveness of the R&D strategy, enhance the relationship between the R&D strategy and the growth of non-SOEs, but will damage the effectiveness of the advertising strategy and reduce the relationship between the advertising strategy and the growth of non-SOEs. The cross-cutting identity of senior executives shows its double sides again.

Key words: cross-cutting identity of senior executives, double-side effect, the growth of non-SOEs, R&D strategy, advertising strategy

陶厚永, 李玲. 高管身份跨界的“双刃剑”与民营企业成长[J]. , 2016, 28(10): 153-168.

Tao Houyong, Li Ling. The Double-edged Sword of Cross-cutting Identity of Senior Executives and Its Effect on the Growth of Non-SOEs[J]. , 2016, 28(10): 153-168.

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