管理评论

›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (5): 47-60.

• 电子商务与信息管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

以社会福利最大化为目标的在线多属性采购拍卖机制设计与实施

朱阁1,2, Andrew B. Whinston2   

  1. 1. 北京信息科技大学信息管理学院, 北京 100192;
    2. McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin 78712
  • 收稿日期:2014-03-24 出版日期:2016-05-28 发布日期:2016-06-02
  • 作者简介:朱阁,北京信息科技大学信息管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士,University of Texas at Austin 访问学者;Andrew B.Whinston, Center for Research in Electronic Commerce, University of Texas at Austin 教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目(71001009;61272513)。

Mechanism Design and Implementation of Online Multi-attribute Procurement Auction with the Objective of Maximizing Social Welfare

Zhu Ge1,2, Andrew B. Whinston2   

  1. 1. School of Information Management, Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Beijing 100192;
    2. McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin 78712
  • Received:2014-03-24 Online:2016-05-28 Published:2016-06-02

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摘要：

鉴于政府采购中在线多属性拍卖的实际要求,利用最优机制设计理论,从社会福利的角度设计了以买卖双方总收益最大化为目标的多属性反向拍卖最优机制。结果显示最优支付不仅由自身生产能力决定,而且受到其它参与者类型的共同影响,而最优质量仅与其自身生产能力相关。利用不完全信息下的博弈理论,从拍卖方的评标规则和投标方的竞标策略角度研究了最优拍卖机制的实施。借助在线多属性采购平台的决策支持,拍卖通过第一阶段多属性密封式投标选定赢者,通过第二阶段多属性公开协商达成最优拍卖机制结果。相比均衡投标结果,最优拍卖机制减少了采购方少量收益并显著增加了投标方的利润,最终使得买卖双方整体福利的增加。理论推导和实例分析都证明该拍卖可以找到最优投标者并实现最优拍卖机制结果。

关键词: 多属性拍卖, 政府采购, 机制设计, 最优拍卖实施

Abstract:

Given the actual requirements of government procurement online multi-attribute auction, the paper designs an optimal multiattribute reverse auction mechanism from the perspective of social welfare with the objective of maximizing the total revenue of buyers and sellers, taking advantage of the optimal mechanism design theory. The results show that the optimal payment is determined not only by its own production capacity, but also by the type of the other participants, while the optimal quality is only associated with its own production capacity. Using incomplete information game theory, the paper studies the implementation of the optimal auction mechanism from the perspective of auctioneer ruling and bidder's bidding strategy. With the decision supporting of online multi-attribute procurement platform, the auction can select the winner through the first phase of multi-attribute sealed bids, and get the optimal auction mechanism result through the second phase of multi-attribute open negotiations. Compared to the equilibrium bid result, the optimal auction mechanism slightly reduces the purchaser's income and significantly increases bidder's profits, resulting in an increase in overall welfare of buyer and seller. Theoretical analysis and case study have proved that the auction mechanism can find the optimal bidder and achieve the optimal result.

Key words: multi-attribute auction, government procurement, mechanism design, optimal auction implementation