管理评论

›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (1): 73-82.

• 组织与战略管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

媒体负面报道对控股股东掏空行为影响的实证研究

李明, 叶勇   

  1. 西南交通大学经济管理学院, 成都 610031
  • 收稿日期:2013-10-31 出版日期:2016-01-30 发布日期:2016-02-01
  • 通讯作者: 叶勇(通讯作者),西南交通大学经济管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 作者简介:李明,西南交通大学经济管理学院博士研究生;
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目(70602035;71090402);教育部人文社科基金项目(11YJA790189;12YJC790070);四川省青年科技基金项目(2012JQ0022)。

The Influence of Negative Media Coverage on Tunneling of Controlling Shareholder: Evidence from China

Li Ming, Ye Yong   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031
  • Received:2013-10-31 Online:2016-01-30 Published:2016-02-01

PDF (PC)

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摘要：

作为公司治理的重要外部治理机制,媒体负面报道对约束控股股东行为、保护投资者利益有着重要影响。基于中国的特殊制度背景,我们以中国2010-2012年的非金融类上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了媒体负面报道对控股股东掏空行为的影响。研究结果表明,媒体负面报道能够减少控股股东的掏空;相对于国有上市公司,在媒体负面报道后非国有上市公司控股股东掏空程度减少的较大。本文的研究结论不仅有利于进一步认识媒体的公司治理作用,而且有助于推进公司治理的完善,保护投资者利益。

关键词: 媒体负面报道, 控股股东, 掏空, 投资者保护

Abstract:

As an important external corporate governance mechanism, negative media coverage has great impacts on restraining controlling stakeholder's behavior and protecting the interest of investors. Under the Chinese especial institutional background, we empirically test the impacts of negative media coverage on controlling shareholder's tunneling behavior, with the sample of 2010-2012 non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The empirical results demonstrate that negative media coverage can reduce controlling shareholder's tunneling behavior, and compared with state-owned listed companies, non-state owned listed companies are more likely to reduce the controlling shareholder's tunneling behavior when there's negative media coverage. The research results are not only conducive for a deeper understanding of media's role in corporate governance, but also helpful in promoting the perfection of corporate governance and protecting the interest of investors.

Key words: negative media coverage, controlling stakeholder, tunneling, investor protection