区域一体化、地方政府合作与资本跨地区流动——来自企业异地并购的证据

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 建设全国统一大市场是构建新发展格局的基础支撑和内在要求，深化地方政府合作是破除地方保护与市场分割的重要手段。本文以一系列区域一体化发展规划文件的发布为准自然实验，构建渐进双重差分模型，分析区域一体化背景下资本跨地区流动的影响、机制及带来的经济后果。研究发现，区域一体化显著提升了企业区域内异地并购的概率、数量占比及金额占比。机制分析发现，在区域一体化背景下，地方官员的政治晋升概率受到区域整体经济发展及区域内其他城市经济发展的正向影响；并且，当地方政府合作意愿较低时，区域一体化对企业区域内异地并购行为的促进作用更为显著。这些结果说明，区域一体化能够通过强化地方政府合作来促进资本跨地区流动。经济后果显示，区域一体化背景下的区域内异地并购行为有助于区域内城市经济的发展。本文不仅拓展了区域一体化和资本跨地区流动的研究范畴，还为深化地方政府合作、加快建设全国统一大市场等提供了启示。

关键词: 区域一体化, 资本跨地区流动, 异地并购, 地方政府合作

Abstract: Building a national unified market is the fundamental support and inherent requirement for constructing a new development pattern. Deepening local governments cooperation is an important means to break down local protectionism and market fragmentation. Taking the release of a series of regional integration development planning documents as a quasi-natural experiment, this study constructs a progressive difference-in-differences model to explore the impact of regional integration on capital cross-city flows as well as the underlying mechanism and economic consequences. The results show that regional integration significantly increases the probability, quantity proportion, and amount proportion of firms' cross-city M&As in the same region (referred to as intra-regional cross-city M&As). Mechanism analysis finds that after the enactment of regional integration policy, the political promotion probability of local officials is positively affected by the overall regional economic development and the economic development of other cities in the region. Moreover, the promoting effect of regional integration on firms' intra-regional cross-city M&As is stronger when local governments have a lower willingness to cooperate, indicating that strengthening local government cooperation is an important mechanism for regional integration to promote the flow of capital across cities. Economic consequence research shows that firms' intra-regional cross-city M&As in the context of regional integration can promote the economic development of the cities in the same region. In theory, this study expands the research on the economic consequences of China's regional integration and the influencing factors of capital cross-city flows. In practice, this study provides some empirical evidence and policy references for accelerating the construction of a national unified market and promoting common prosperity.

Key words: regional integration, capital cross-city flows, cross-city M&As, local government cooperation

潘红波, 杨海霞, 孙嘉欣. 区域一体化、地方政府合作与资本跨地区流动——来自企业异地并购的证据[J]. 管理评论, 2026, 38(3): 158-169.

Pan Hongbo, Yang Haixia, Sun Jiaxin. Regional Integration, Local Government Cooperation and Capital Cross-city Flows: Evidence from Corporate Cross-city Mergers and Acquisitions[J]. Management Review, 2026, 38(3): 158-169.

参考文献

[1] Li H. B., Zhou L. A. Political Turnover and Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2005,89(9-10):1743-1762
[2] 周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究, 2004,39(6):33-40 Zhou L. A. The Incentive and Cooperation of Government Officials in the Political Tournaments:An Interpretation of the Prolonged Local Protectionism and Duplicative Investments in China[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2004,39(6):33-40
[3] 宋小宁,曹慧娟,马光荣.国家巡回法庭与资本跨区流动:央地司法关系视角[J].经济学(季刊), 2023,23(5):1793-1809 Song X. N., Cao H. J., Ma G. R. Circuit Court and Cross-region Capital Flows:From the Perspective of Central and Local Judicial Relations[J]. China Economic Quarterly, 2023,23(5):1793-1809
[4] 范子英,周小昶.财政激励、市场一体化与企业跨地区投资——基于所得税分享改革的研究[J].中国工业经济, 2022,(2):118-136 Fan Z. Y., Zhou X. C. Fiscal Incentives, Market Integration and Cross-region Investment-Evidence from Income Tax Sharing Reform[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2022,(2):118-136
[5] 李建成,程玲,吴明琴.政府协调下的市场整合与企业创新伙伴选择[J].世界经济, 2022,45(4):187-216 Li J. C., Cheng L., Wu M. Q. Government Collaboration, Market Integration and Matching of Firm Innovation Partners[J]. The Journal of World Economy, 2022,45(4):187-216
[6] 柳美君,李伟平,杨斯杰,等.长三角区域一体化政策对科技人才流动的影响研究[J].科学学研究, 2024,42(4):733-745 Liu M. J., Li W. P., Yang S. J., et al. The Effect of Regional Integration Policy on Scientific Mobility:Evidence from the Yangtze River Delta[J]. Studies in Science of Science, 2024,42(4):733-745
[7] Bhagwat V., Brogaard J., Julio B. A BIT Goes a Long Way:Bilateral Investment Treaties and Cross-border Mergers[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2021,140(2):514-538
[8] 杨继彬,李善民,杨国超,等.省际双边信任与资本跨区域流动——基于企业异地并购的视角[J].经济研究, 2021,56(4):41-59 Yang J. B., Li S. M., Yang G. C., et al. Interprovincial Bilateral Trust and Inter-Regional Capital Flows:Based on the Perspective of Inter-Regional M&As[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2021,56(4):41-59
[9] Itoh H. Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations[J]. Econometrica, 1991,59(3):611-636
[10] Alok S., Gopalan R. Managerial Compensation in Multidivision Firms[J]. Management Science, 2018,64(6):2856-2874
[11] 王先甲,欧蓉,陈佳瑜.公平偏好下双代理人激励契约设计研究[J].中国管理科学, 2022,30(1):100-110 Wang X. J., Ou R., Chen J. Y. Research on the Design of Double-Agent Incentive Contract under Fairness Preference[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022,30(1):100-110
[12] 郑军,郭宇欣,唐亮.区域一体化合作能否助推产业结构升级?——基于长三角城市经济协调会的准自然实验[J].中国软科学, 2021,(8):75-85 Zheng J., Guo Y. X., Tang L. Does Regional Integration Cooperation Promote Industrial Structure Upgrading?—Quasi-natural Experimental Evidence from Urban Economic Coordination Committee[J]. China Soft Science, 2021,(8):75-85
[13] 黄志基,石涛,贺灿飞.城市群批复缓和工业用地出让价格竞争了吗?——来自中国19个城市群的经验证据[J].管理评论, 2025,37(5):17-29 Huang Z. J., Shi T., He C. F. Has the Urban Agglomeration Policy Eased Competition for Industrial Land Prices?—Empirical Evidence from 19 Urban Agglomerations in China[J]. Management Review, 2025,37(5):17-29
[14] 张学良,李培鑫,李丽霞.政府合作、市场整合与城市群经济绩效——基于长三角城市经济协调会的实证检验[J].经济学(季刊), 2017,16(4):1563-1582 Zhang X. L., Li P. X., Li L. X. Government Cooperation, Market Integration and Economic Performance of City Cluster:Evidence from the Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic Coordination Committee[J]. China Economic Quarterly, 2017,16(4):1563-1582
[15] 陈运森,韩慧云,陈德球.区域一体化战略、社会网络与商业信用——基于京津冀一体化的证据[J].管理科学学报, 2023,26(3):69-92 Chen Y. S., Han H. Y., Chen D. Q. Regional Integration Strategy, Social Network and Trade Credits:Evidence from Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Integration[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2023,26(3):69-92
[16] 谢红军,蒋殿春.竞争优势、资产价格与中国海外并购[J].金融研究, 2017,(1):83-98 Xie H. J., Jiang D. C. Competitive Advantage, Asset Price and China's Overseas M&A[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2017,(1):83-98
[17] Aleksanyan M., Hao Z., Vagenas-Nanos E., et al. Do State Visits Affect Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions?[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2021,66:101800
[18] 杨连星,铁瑛.区域贸易协定、投资条款差异性深化与跨国并购意愿[J].管理世界, 2023,39(9):36-59 Yang L. X., Tie Y. Regional Trade Agreements, Deepening Difference of Investment Terms, and Willingness to Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions[J]. Journal of Management World, 2023,39(9):36-59
[19] 巫岑,罗婷,饶品贵.政府引导、财政分权与企业并购[J].经济科学, 2021,(5):20-36 Wu C., Luo T., Rao P. G. Government Guidance, Fiscal Decentralization, and M&As[J]. Economic Science, 2021,(5):20-36
[20] Kim H., Kim W. Does Tunneling Explain the Sensitivity of Executive Compensation to Other Member Firms'Performance?[J]. Journal of Business Finance&Accounting, 2020,47(9-10):1268-1289
[21] 方军雄.政府干预、所有权性质与企业并购[J].管理世界, 2008,(9):118-123 Fang J. X. The Government Intervention, the Nature of Ownership and Enterprises'Mergers and Acquisitions[J]. Journal of Management World, 2008,(9):118-123
[22] 潘红波,杨海霞.竞争者融资约束对企业并购行为的影响研究[J].中国工业经济, 2022,(7):159-177 Pan H. B., Yang H. X. The Effect of Competitor Financial Constraints on Corporate Acquisitions[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2022,(7):159-177
[23] 潘红波,余明桂.支持之手、掠夺之手与异地并购[J].经济研究, 2011,46(9):108-120 Pan H. B., Yu M. G. Helping Hand, Grabbing Hand and Inter-Province Mergers[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2011,46(9):108-120
[24] Li J., Xia J., Lin Z. Y. Cross-Border Acquisitions by State-Owned Firms:How do Legitimacy Concerns Affect the Completion and Duration of their Acquisitions?[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2017,38(9):1915-1934
[25] 周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究, 2007,42(7):36-50 Zhou L. A. Governing China's Local Officials:An Analysis of Promotion Tournament Model[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2007,42(7):36-50
[26] 徐现祥,李郇,王美今.区域一体化、经济增长与政治晋升[J].经济学(季刊), 2007,7(4):1075-1096 Xu X. X., Li X., Wang M. J. Regional Integration, Economic Growth and Political Promotion[J]. China Economic Quarterly, 2007,7(4):1075-1096
[27] 周黎安,陶婧.官员晋升竞争与边界效应:以省区交界地带的经济发展为例[J].金融研究, 2011,(3):15-26 Zhou L. A., Tao J. Bureaucratic Promotion Competition and Border Effect:Evidence from Economic Development in China's Border Regions[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2011,(3):15-26
[28] Jiang J. Y. Making Bureaucracy Work:Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China[J]. American Journal of Political Science, 2018,62(4):982-999
[29] 邓洁,潘爽,叶德珠.官员任期、政策偏好与城市创新[J].科研管理, 2023,44(1):114-124 Deng J., Pan S., Ye D. Z. Officials'Tenure, Policy Preferences and Urban Innovation[J]. Science Research Management, 2023,44(1):114-124
[30] Yao Y., Zhang M. Y. Subnational Leaders and Economic Growth:Evidence from Chinese Cities[J]. Journal of Economic Growth, 2015,20(4):405-436