薪酬倒挂与企业创新——基于国有企业集团的证据

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 创新是企业重要的战略决策，对企业建立长期竞争优势具有重大意义。然而，以往的实践和研究均表明，受制于各种利益机制，企业的创新行为存在重大差异。薪酬契约作为重要的激励机制，会直接影响高管的决策行为，国有企业集团与下属公司高管间的薪酬倒挂现象为本文识别企业差异化的创新行为提供了契机。本文以2015—2019年国有企业集团下属A股上市公司为样本，考察薪酬倒挂对企业创新投入的影响。本文发现：薪酬倒挂会导致创新投入增加，倒挂程度越高，公司创新投入水平越高；辩护动机是上述影响的重要机制。进一步分析发现，薪酬倒挂促使企业进行策略性创新，即主要增加创新产出的数量，但创新质量未得到显著提升。本文基于国有企业薪酬体制改革背景分析了企业创新行为，从薪酬辩护视角丰富了企业创新动机的研究，为理解国有企业薪酬体制改革的政策后果带来一定启示。

关键词: 薪酬倒挂, 国有企业, 企业创新

Abstract: Innovation is a crucial strategic activity for firms, and has a significant impact on firms' building long-term competitive advantages. However, previous practice and studies have demonstrated that there are substantial variations in firms' innovation behaviors caused by different interest mechanisms. The executives' decision-making behaviors can be directly impacted by the salary contracts, which is a key incentive mechanism. The occurrence of executive “salary inversion” between state-owned enterprise groups and their subordinate firms provides an opportunity for this study to identify differentiated innovation behaviors of firms. This study investigates how salary inversion affects a firm's innovation investment using a sample of A-share listed firms affiliated to state-owned enterprise groups from 2015 to 2019. As this study reveals that salary inversion leads to an increase in innovation investment, and the higher degree of salary inversion in a firm, the higher investment the firm tends to make in innovation. Further analysis shows that salary inversion motivates firms to choose tactic innovation, which mainly increases the quantity of innovation output, but does not significantly improve the quality of innovation. This paper provides an analysis of firm innovation behaviors within the framework of state-owned enterprise's salary system reform, an examination of firm innovation motivation from the pay defense perspective, and some new insights into the policy ramifications of state-owned enterprise salary system reform.

Key words: salary inversion, state-owned enterprise groups, firm innovation

卢闯, 焦焰, 张文婷. 薪酬倒挂与企业创新——基于国有企业集团的证据[J]. 管理评论, 2026, 38(1): 78-89.

Lu Chuang, Jiao Yan, Zhang Wenting. Salary Inversion and Firm Innovation—Evidence from Chinese State-owned Enterprise Groups[J]. Management Review, 2026, 38(1): 78-89.

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