管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (4): 239-252.

• 公共管理 • 上一篇    

基于消费者绿色偏好的农户绿色生产行为演化博弈分析

何奇龙1,2, 王卿人3, 李琴英1, 罗兴1, 唐娟红4   

  1. 1. 郑州大学商学院, 郑州 450001;
    2. 郑州大学政治与公共管理学院, 郑州 450001;
    3. 南安普顿大学社会科学学院, 南安普顿 SO17 1BJ;
    4. 武汉大学经济与管理学院, 武汉 430072
  • 收稿日期:2022-06-27 发布日期:2025-05-06
  • 作者简介:何奇龙，郑州大学商学院副教授，硕士生导师，郑州大学政治与公共管理学院博士后；王卿人，南安普顿大学社会科学学院硕士研究生；李琴英（通讯作者），郑州大学商学院教授，博士生导师，博士；罗兴，郑州大学商学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士；唐娟红，武汉大学经济与管理学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金一般项目（22BJY087）。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Farmers Green Production Behavior Based on Consumer Green Preferences

He Qilong1,2, Wang Qingren3, Li Qinying1, Luo Xing1, Tang Juanhong4   

  1. 1. Business School, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001;
    2. School of Politics and Public Administration, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001;
    3. Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ;
    4. School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072
  • Received:2022-06-27 Published:2025-05-06

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摘要： 农户是农业生产的主体，推动农户整体进行绿色生产转型是我国农业全面绿色转型发展的关键，也是一项系统性革命。市场需求端消费者基于绿色偏好所形成的绿色农产品需求是推动农业全面绿色转型的根本动力，这些需求能否传导到生产端并转化为更多农户的绿色生产行为至关重要。现实中，农户的生产行为表现为群体内部的基于社会学习和期望收益最大化的复杂动态演化特征。本文引入生物群落策略更新的Moran过程，模拟消费者绿色偏好驱动下农户绿色生产行为决策中的社会学习机制，并针对不同选择强度下的农户，分析其绿色生产策略成为演化稳定策略的条件。研究发现：①任意选择强度下，消费者绿色偏好、农户绿色认知度和政府生态补偿正向激励农户绿色生产，而绿色生产成本系数反向抑制农户绿色生产，但不同选择强度下，绿色生产策略在群体扎根的边界条件不同；②随机因素主导的弱选择下，生态补贴只要大于绿色生产成本，对任意种群数量均有利于绿色生产取代一般生产策略；③任意选择强度下，农产品绿色度与绿色生产策略扎根的边界条件均呈“倒U”型关系；④在收益满足相应的边界条件后，若种群数量大于相应的临界值，农户绿色生产策略将占优，且随着消费者绿色偏好增强，该临界值均逐渐减小。总而言之，以市场需求为导向实现农业全面绿色转型这一系统性革命是可行的，政府的适度介入（补贴和宣传等）也能够进一步激发市场力量的释放和高效发挥。

关键词: 消费者绿色偏好, 演化博弈, Moran过程, 绿色生产行为

Abstract: China is a large country with a huge number of smallholder farmers, who are the main body of agricultural production, so motivating them to shift toward green production is the key for China to get on the trajetory of green agricultural development, and it is also a systematic revolution. Pro-green consumers’ demand for green products is the fundamental force driving the overall green transformation of agriculture. The key depends on whether the demand can be transmitted to the production side and transformed into more green production behaviors of farmers. In reality, the production behavior of farmers is characterized by complex dynamic evolution within the group based on social learning and maximizing expected returns. This paper introduces the Moran process of biomes strategy renewal, simulates the social learning mechanism of farmers’ green production decision-making, and analyzes the conditions under which farmers’ green production strategies become evolutionarily stable strategies driven by consumers’ green preferences for farmers with different choice intensities. The results show that: (1) under any selection intensity, consumers’ green preference, farmers’ green awareness and government’ s ecological compensation positively encourage farmers’ green production, while the cost coefficient of green production negatively inhibits farmers’ green production; (2) under weak selection dominated by random factors, as long as the ecological subsidy is greater than the green production cost, it is beneficial for the green production to replace the general production strategy for any population; (3) under any selection intensity, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the greenness of agricultural products and the boundary conditions of green production strategy taking root; (4) after satisfying the corresponding boundary conditions, if the population size is greater than the corresponding critical value, the green production strategy of farmers will be dominant, and as consumer green preferences increase, this critical value gradually decreases. In summary, it is feasible to realize the systematic revolution of green agricultural transformation guided by market demand, and government participation (such as subsidies and publicity) can further give play to the market power.

Key words: consumer green preference, evolutionary game, Moran process, green production behavior