管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (2): 224-236.

• 运作管理 • 上一篇    

平台生态标签情境下的漂绿行为演化与监管研究

王利莎1, 王子琳2, 王永昭3   

  1. 1. 华北水利水电大学管理与经济学院, 郑州 450046;
    2. 郑州大学管理学院, 郑州 450001;
    3. 安阳师范学院数学与统计学院, 安阳 455000
  • 收稿日期:2022-08-24 发布日期:2025-03-06
  • 作者简介:王利莎，华北水利水电大学管理与经济学院讲师，硕士生导师，博士；王子琳，郑州大学管理学院硕士研究生；王永昭（通讯作者），安阳师范学院数学与统计学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    河南省软科学研究计划项目（222400410052；232400410050）；教育部人文社会科学基金项目（22YJC630002）；河南省高校人文社会科学研究一般项目（2023-ZDJH-027）。

The Supervision Mechanism of Sales Platform Eco-labels Based on Evolutionary Game

Wang Lisha1, Wang Zilin2, Wang Yongzhao3   

  1. 1. School of Management and Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046;
    2. School of Management, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001;
    3. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Anyang Normal University, Anyang 455000
  • Received:2022-08-24 Published:2025-03-06

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摘要： 针对当前扰乱绿色产品市场秩序的制造商漂绿行为，本文在新兴的环境属性披露工具——平台生态标签情境下，首先构建了消费者绿色环保意识影响制造商绿色生产行为选择的演化博弈模型，发现消费者及制造商群体的行为选择决策主要受到效用折扣、声誉性奖惩总额及产品成本差额的影响。具体而言，消费者对绿色产品关切程度较高，且能积极给予声誉性奖惩时，可以有效减少制造商漂绿行为。因此，为了发挥平台与需求端消费者的联动作用，本文接着建立了规避制造商漂绿行为的平台-消费者协同监管机制，分析影响制造商生产行为选择和协同监管强度的重要因素。研究表明，监管成本差额、效益差额、宽松监管下的罚金总额以及协同监管下给予制造商的声誉性奖惩总额是影响演化博弈均衡的重要因素，因而增加平台信息透明度、提高消费者投诉的响应度，或增加处罚力度均可以加速市场均衡。研究结果及启示为破解平台生态标签情境下制造企业的漂绿生产困局，找到实现有效监管的实施路径提供建议。

关键词: 平台生态标签, 漂绿行为, 协同监管机制, 演化博弈

Abstract: In view of the manufacturers’ greenwashing problem disrupting the market order of green supply chain, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model for consumers’ environmental behavior choices and manufacturers’ green production decision under Sales Platform Eco-labels (i.e. SPE-labels) - a disclosure tool for emerging environmental policy. A supervision mechanism between platform and consumer is established to guard against manufacturers’ greenwashing, and the important factors affecting manufacturers’ behavior and supervision intensity are analyzed. The results show that consumers’ green behavior and manufacturers’ production decisions are mainly affected by utility discounts, the total of reputational rewards and punishments, and the gap between product costs. Specifically, when consumers are more concerned about green products and give reputational rewards and punishments actively, greenwashing will get controlled effectively. Therefore, in order to give play to the linkage role of the e-commerce platforms and the consumers, this paper introduces a platform-consumer joint supervision model to explore the evolutionary stability strategy under the platform-consumer cooperative supervision. The gap between the costs, between the benefits and the total fines under loose supervision, and the reputational rewards and punishments under joint supervision model are critical factors which affect the equilibrium of evolutionary games. The evolution time of the equilibrium strategy can be shortened by increasing platform information transparency, improving responsiveness to consumer complaints, and increasing penalties. This paper provides some inspiration and suggestions for the decision makers in e-commerce market.

Key words: Sales Platform Eco-labels, greenwashing, supervision mechanism, evolutionary game