管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2024, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (9): 219-229.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    

考虑不对称需求的混合平台零售供应链促销策略研究

张鹏1, 马俊2, 朱小武3, 张澄1,4   

  1. 1. 上海对外经贸大学工商管理学院, 上海 201620;
    2. 对外经济贸易大学国际商学院, 北京 100029;
    3. 中南财经政法大学统计与数学学院, 武汉 430073;
    4. 上海外国语大学国际工商管理学院, 上海 20162
  • 收稿日期:2022-10-31 发布日期:2024-10-10
  • 作者简介:张鹏,上海对外经贸大学工商管理学院讲师,硕士生导师,博士;马俊(通讯作者),对外经济贸易大学国际商学院教授,博士生导师,博士;朱小武,中南财经政法大学统计与数学学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士;张澄,上海外国语大学国际工商管理学院硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目（72071047）；对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务专项资金资助（19YB03）；中南财经政法大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金（2722021BX024）。

Study on the Channel Promotion Strategies for the Hybrid E-platform Retail Supply Chain Considering Asymmetric Potential Channel Demand

Zhang Peng1, Ma Jun2, Zhu Xiaowu3, Zhang Cheng1,4   

  1. 1. School of Management, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai 201620;
    2. Business School, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029;
    3. School of Statistics and Mathematics, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073;
    4. School of Business and Management, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai 201620
  • Received:2022-10-31 Published:2024-10-10

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摘要： 基于电商零售平台自营与制造商寄售并存的混合平台零售供应链，围绕双方的促销策略竞争构建多阶段促销博弈模型,研究双方针对各自运营渠道的促销策略选择，并讨论不对称渠道基础需求对决策结果的影响。考虑四类决策情境：电商零售平台与制造商皆不促销、仅制造商（电商零售平台）促销寄售渠道（自营渠道）以及双方皆促销各自运营渠道。研究发现：针对寄售渠道促销总是制造商的最优促销策略。电商零售平台与制造商的均衡促销策略取决于寄售渠道佣金率、渠道竞争强度和渠道基础需求差异的关系。制造商在均衡促销策略下总可以获得最高总利润，而电商零售平台能否在均衡促销策略下获得最高总利润，取决于渠道竞争强度与制造商寄售渠道基础需求。此外，制造商和电商零售平台在均促销各自运营渠道时实现混合平台零售供应链系统最高利润，消费者总是获益于制造商促销寄售渠道。

关键词: 混合平台零售供应链, 促销, 定价, 渠道竞争, 不对称需求

Abstract: The e-commerce retail platform has evolved into a hybrid retail platform where the platform sells through itself-operated channel and the manufacturer sells on consignment. This paper constructs a multi-stage game model based on a hybrid e-commerce retail platform to investigate the promotion game between the e-commerce retail platform and the manufacturer, and to discuss the impact of asymmetric channel potential demand on the decision outcomes. Four scenarios are considered: neither of the e-commerce retail platform and the manufacturer promotes its channel, the manufacturer promotes the consignment channel but the e-commerce retail platform does not, the e-commerce retail platform promotes its self-operated channel but the manufacturer does not, and the two parties both promote their respective operating channels. It is found that promotion for the consignment channel is always the dominant promotion strategy for the manufacturer, regardless of the commission rate of the consignment channel, the intensity of channel competition, and the difference in the potential demand of the channels. The equilibrium promotion strategies between the e-commerce retail platform and the manufacturer depends on the relationship among the commission rate of the consignment channel, the intensity of channel competition, and the difference in potential channel demand. When the intensity of channel competition is low, the difference in potential channel demand does not affect the choice of equilibrium promotion strategy between the e-commerce retail platform and the manufacturer, and both parties will launch promotions for their respective operating channels at the same time. When the intensity of channel competition is high, the choice of equilibrium promotion strategies between the two parties depends on the difference in the potential demand between the two channels. If the potential demand of the consignment channel is small then both parties promote their respective operating channels is still an equilibrium strategy, if the potential demand of the consignment channel is large then the e-commerce retail platform will choose not to promote its own channel. Moreover, the manufacturer can always obtain the highest total profit under the equilibrium promotion strategies, while whether the e-commerce retail platform can obtain the highest total profit under the equilibrium promotion strategies depends on the intensity of channel competition and the manufacturer’s consignment channel potential demand.

Key words: hybrid platform retail supply chain, promotion, pricing, channel competition, asymmetric demand