管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2024, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (6): 19-29.

• 数据要素管理 • 上一篇    

数据产品开发的激励机制研究：道德风险理论视角

刘源1, 喻迎2, 陈宏民3   

  1. 1. 广东工业大学管理学院, 广州 510520;
    2. 澳门理工大学人文及社会科学学院, 澳门 999078;
    3. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院, 上海 201406
  • 收稿日期:2023-09-29 发布日期:2024-07-05
  • 作者简介:刘源，广东工业大学管理学院讲师，博士；喻迎，澳门理工大学人文及社会科学学院博士研究生；陈宏民，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院教授，博士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目（20JZD010）；国家自然科学基金重点项目（72031006）。

Research on the Incentive Mechanisms of Data Product Development: A Perspective on Moral Hazard

Liu Yuan1, Yu Ying2, Chen Hongmin3   

  1. 1. School of Management, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520;
    2. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao 999078;
    3. Antai College of Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 201406
  • Received:2023-09-29 Published:2024-07-05

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摘要： 在“数据二十条”确定的“谁投入、谁贡献、谁受益”原则下，如何有效地激励企业投入开发数据产品，提高其参与数据要素市场的积极性，成了各级政府以及数据交易所面临的关键问题。本文将传统的道德风险理论拓展到了数据交易所的双边市场环境中，分析了交易所的最优激励措施及其影响。结果表明：（1）在双边市场的环境下，由于买家也能从数据产品的开发中获益，交易所可能会将数据产品开发商的努力成本转嫁到买家的会员费上；（2）交易所在确定激励措施时，应综合考虑开发商和买家之间所形成的网络效应，边际网络效应的增强将提升各市场主体的福利水平；（3）随着补贴额度的提高，产品补贴会比登记挂牌补贴带来更高的社会福利水平提升。本文的研究丰富了传统的激励理论和双边市场理论的分析框架，为数据交易所激励企业开发数据产品提供了理论参考。

关键词: 数据产品开发, 激励机制, 道德风险, 数据交易所, 双边市场

Abstract: To make the best of the principle of “those who make an investment and contribution are supposed to benefit” as set out in “Data 20”, government authorities and data exchanges have to find out how to effectively motivate firms to invest in the development of data products and enhance their participation in the data market. This paper extends traditional moral hazard theory to the two-sided market setting, and analyzes the optimal incentive measures of data exchanges and their impacts. The results indicate that: (1) in a two-sided market environment since buyers also benefit from developers’ efforts in data product development, the cost of these efforts may be transferred to the membership fees that exchanges charge buyers; (2) when determining the incentive measures, data exchanges should consider the network effects between developers and buyers, and an increase in the strength of marginal network effects can contribute to the improvement of welfare for each participant in the market; (3) as subsidy levels increase, product subsidies lead to a higher improvement in social welfare than listing registration subsidies. This study enriches the analytical frameworks of traditional incentive theory and two-sided market theory, and provides a theoretical reference for data exchanges in motivating firms to invest in the development of data products.

Key words: data product development, incentive mechanism, moral hazard, data exchanges, two-sided markets