围观的“赢者诅咒”效应——来自2020年浙江省网络司法拍卖房产的证据

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 拍卖市场中的拍品价格若被过高估值，参与者可能因为赢得拍卖而亏损，称为“赢者诅咒”。本文结合信息经济学有限关注理论及行为经济学的过度反应和从众效应理论，对最高价公开拍卖共同价值模型进行拓展，并利用2020年淘宝司法拍卖平台上的6690份浙江省网络法拍房数据进行实证分析。研究发现:①围观提高了网络法拍房的成交溢价，增加了“赢者诅咒”出现的概率，产生围观的“赢者诅咒”效应;②该效应因围观引起竞价人的过度反应和从众行为而形成，围观的信息传递路径并未得到验证。本文的研究结论建立在共同价值拍卖基准模型拓展而来的理论基础上，与行为经济学的过度反应和从众效应推论相符，同时经受了充分的稳健性检验，为进一步研究拍卖市场中的非理性行为提供了一个有益的实证证据。

关键词: “赢者诅咒”, 围观, 关注, 拍卖, 网络司法拍卖房产

Abstract: The phenonenon of a bidder suffering a loss due to winning an auction at an overvalued price is called winner's curse. In this paper, based on the limited attention theory from information economics and the over-action and Herd effect theory from behavior eco-nomics, we extend the first price common value auction model. Using data including 6,690 samples from on-line Taobao Judicial Foreclo-sure in Zhejiang province, China in 2020 to test the theoretical hypothesis, we find that (1) large crowd size leads to a high premium that may cause the winner to suffer a loss, and this is called the winner's curse effect of the crowd; (2) the effect is caused by bidders' over-reaction and conformity behavior in the presence of the crowd, but the path of information transfer through the crowd is not empiri-cally detected. Our conclusions are theoretically extended from the classical common value auction model, consistent with the implica-tions from the over-reaction and Herd effect theory, and fully tenable in the robustness test. This paper could be a useful empirical proof as the economic anomaly in auction markets.

Key words: the Winners' Curse, the crowd, attention, auction, on-line judicial foreclosure

赖玥, 成天柱, 张俊丽. 围观的“赢者诅咒”效应——来自2020年浙江省网络司法拍卖房产的证据[J]. 管理评论, 2024, 36(5): 49-63，74.

Lai Yue, Cheng Tianzhu, Zhang Junli. The Winner's Curse Effect of the Crowd in Auctions: Evidence from On-line Judicial Foreclosure of Zhejiang Province in 2020[J]. Management Review, 2024, 36(5): 49-63，74.

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