管理评论 ›› 2024, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (2): 40-53.

• 经济与金融管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

基础设施PPP项目绩效协同提升机制研究

郑传斌   

  1. 苏州科技大学商学院, 苏州 215009
  • 收稿日期:2022-01-18 出版日期:2024-02-28 发布日期:2024-03-30
  • 作者简介:郑传斌,苏州科技大学商学院讲师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目(71801169);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究项目(2019SJA1274);苏州科技大学人文社科类校级科研基金项目(XKR202110);苏州科技大学人才引进科研启动项目(331911804)。

Research on Collaborative Improvement Mechanism of Infrastructure PPP Project Performance

Zheng Chuanbin   

  1. School of Business, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215009
  • Received:2022-01-18 Online:2024-02-28 Published:2024-03-30

摘要: 随着公众在基础设施PPP项目实施过程中的作用显著提升,针对如何发挥公众在基础设施PPP项目绩效提升中的重要作用,本研究构建了政府激励、社会资本提升、公众参与的基础设施PPP项目绩效协同提升演化博弈模型,构建了考虑绩效提升目标区间的社会资本利益分配模型,并通过仿真分析探究了三方协同提升绩效的行为策略选择及其影响因素。研究结果表明:任一方行为策略选择及其演化路径均与其他博弈主体的行为策略紧密相关,且它们对彼此初始策略的影响存在差异;公信力提升、上级部门奖励等收益、罚金对政府的激励行为具有正向作用,而政府的激励成本对政府的激励行为具有负向作用;提升绩效获得的收益与罚金对社会资本具有正向作用;参与绩效提升获得的收益对公众的参与行为具有正向作用,社会资本进行绩效提升获得的收益对公众的参与行为具有负向作用;社会资本的利益分配与目标范围、奖励因子和惩罚因子等参数息息相关,且随着绩效目标范围的增大,社会资本的利益分配逐渐减小。研究成果有利于丰富和完善项目绩效管理理论,为政府出台相关政策、设计PPP项目绩效提升机制提供参考。

关键词: 三方演化博弈, 基础设施, PPP项目绩效, 协同提升, 利益分配

Abstract: With the significant increase in the role of the public in the implementation of infrastructure PPP projects, this study constructs an evolutionary game model for the synergistic performance enhancement of infrastructure PPP projects with government incentives, social capital enhancement, and public participation, constructs a social capital benefit distribution model considering the target interval of performance enhancement, and through a simulation analysis explores the behavioral strategy choice and its influencing factors for the collaborative performance improvement of the three parties. The study shows that: the behavioral strategy choice of any party and its evolution path is closely related to the behavioral strategies of other game players, and their influence on each other’s initial strategies is different; the benefits such as credibility enhancement, rewards from higher authorities, and fines have positive effects on the government’s incentive behavior, while the government’s incentive costs have negative effects on the government’s incentive behavior. The benefit distribution of social capital is closely related to the parameters of the target range, reward factor, and penalty factor, and the benefit distribution of social capital decreases with the increase of the target range of performance. The benefit distribution of social capital is related to the parameters of target scope, reward factors, and penalty factors, and the benefit distribution of social capital gradually decreases as the scope of the performance target increases. The research results are conducive to enriching and improving project performance management theories, and providing reference for government to introduce relevant policies and design performance enhancement mechanisms for PPP projects.

Key words: tripartite evolutionary game, infrastructure, PPP project performance, collaborative improvement, benefit distribution