管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2024, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (1): 3-15.

• 经济与金融管理 •    下一篇

互惠性偏好视角下的碳捕集、利用与封存项目产业化发展研究

丁黎黎, 马文, 白雨   

  1. 中国海洋大学经济学院, 青岛 266100
  • 收稿日期:2021-10-29 出版日期:2024-01-28 发布日期:2024-03-06
  • 通讯作者: 马文(通讯作者),中国海洋大学经济学院博士研究生。
  • 作者简介:丁黎黎,中国海洋大学经济学院教授,博士生导师,博士;白雨,中国海洋大学经济学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目（71973132）。

Research on the Industrialization Development of Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage Projects from the Perspective of Reciprocity Preference

Ding Lili, Ma Wen, Bai Yu   

  1. School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100
  • Received:2021-10-29 Online:2024-01-28 Published:2024-03-06

PDF (PC)

130

摘要： 碳捕集、利用与封存（CCUS）项目的产业化发展是各国政府加快实现未来减排目标的重要手段，其发展需要政府引导下能源企业、金融机构等多部门的通力合作。互惠性偏好作为影响合作的一种非理性情绪，使决策者在做出选择时不仅会考虑自身收益，还会考虑利他程度以及对方回报。因此，本文将互惠性偏好引入包含发电商、CCUS运营商和银行的演化博弈模型中，探究CCUS项目产业化发展的非理性影响因素及其微观作用机制。研究结果显示，从推动CCUS项目产业化发展的作用效果来看：（1）当发电商和CCUS运营商均理性时，CCUS运营商投资CO2运输、封存技术的意愿较低，CCUS项目产业化发展无法实现；（2）当仅发电商具有互惠性偏好时，存在一个合理的互惠性偏好范围，使CCUS项目产业化发展能达到帕累托均衡状态，社会资源得到有效配置；（3）当仅CCUS运营商具有互惠性偏好时，也有利于推动CCUS项目产业化发展，但相较于发电商的互惠性偏好，作用效果较弱；（4）当双方均存在互惠性偏好时，发电商的中低互惠性偏好+CCUS运营商的高互惠性偏好是作用效果最好的一种情形。最后基于以上结论，给出促进CCUS项目产业化发展的政策建议，以期促进CCUS产业化项目的健康发展和推广应用。

关键词: 政府补贴, 互惠性偏好, CCUS项目产业化发展, 融资, 演化博弈

Abstract: The industrialization development of carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) projects is an important means for the government to accelerate the realization of future emission reduction targets. Its development requires the cooperation of energy enterprises, financial institutions and other departments under government guidance. As an irrational emotion affecting cooperation, reciprocity preference motivates one party to act not only for its own benefits, but also out of altruism, with the return of other parties in mind. Therefore, this paper introduces reciprocity preference into the evolutionary game model including power producers, CCUS operators and banks to explore the irrational influencing factors and micro mechanism of CCUS industrialization development. The results show that, from the perspective of promoting the industrialization development of CCUS projects, (1) when both power producers and CCUS operators are rational, CCUS operators are less willing to invest in CO2 transport and storage technologies, and the industrialization development of CCUS projects cannot be achieved; (2) when only power producers have reciprocal preference, there is a reasonable range of reciprocal preference, so that the industrial development of CCUS projects can reach Pareto equilibrium and social resources can be effectively allocated; (3) when only CCUS operators have reciprocal preference, it is also conducive to promote the industrialization of CCUS projects, but compared with the reciprocal preference of power producers, the effect is weak; (4) when both parties have reciprocity preference, "medium and low reciprocity preference of power producers + high reciprocity preference of CCUS operators" is the best scenario. Finally, based on the above conclusions, policy recommendations are given to promote the industrialization development of CCUS projects, with the aim of promoting the healthy development and promotion of CCUS industrialization projects.

Key words: government subsidies, reciprocity preference, industrialization development of CCUS projects, financing, evolutionary game