管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (11): 253-271.

• 组织与战略管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

实际控制人境外居留权与公司战略选择

孟庆斌1, 李海彤1, 车玫洁1, 李昕宇2   

  1. 1. 中国人民大学商学院, 北京 100872;
    2. 山东大学经济学院, 济南 250199
  • 收稿日期:2022-07-04 出版日期:2023-11-28 发布日期:2023-12-27
  • 通讯作者: 李海彤(通讯作者),中国人民大学商学院博士研究生。
  • 作者简介:孟庆斌,中国人民大学商学院教授,博士生导师,博士;车玫洁,中国人民大学商学院硕士研究生;李昕宇,山东大学经济学院副研究员,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目(72072178;71772173);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72202121);山东省自然科学基金青年项目(ZR2022QG013)。

Controlling Person's Foreign Residency and Corporate Strategic Choice

Meng Qingbin1, Li Haitong1, Che Meijie1, Li Xinyu2   

  1. 1. Business School, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872;
    2. School of Economics, Shandong University, Jinan 250199
  • Received:2022-07-04 Online:2023-11-28 Published:2023-12-27

摘要: 在当前中国资本市场,民营企业实际控制人拥有境外居留权的现象并不鲜见。本文以2008—2019年民营上市公司为样本,探究实际控制人境外居留权与公司战略选择之间的关系。研究发现,实际控制人境外居留权显著增大了公司战略激进度,验证了境外居留权的“投机效应”假说,该结果在控制内生性并进行一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。同时,中国开展的海外追逃专项行动、签署的国家间引渡协议显著减轻了公司战略受到的影响。进一步研究发现,当实际控制人采取非直接控制公司的方式,或掌握较强控制权的情况下,境外居留权对公司战略激进度的影响更为明显。当管理层持股占比或独立董事人数比例较低时,境外居留权更显著地增大了公司战略激进度。此外,高质量的审计监督与稳健的会计信息处理有助于减轻境外居留权对公司战略激进度的影响。本研究为管理者和投资者理解境外居留权对公司的影响提供了启示,为有关部门开展追逃行动和引渡合作提供了参考。

关键词: 境外居留权, 公司战略, 实际控制人, 民营企业

Abstract: In the current Chinese capital market, it is common for the controlling persons of private enterprises to have foreign residency. Using Chinese private listed firms from 2008 to 2019 as samples, this paper explores the relationship between controlling person's foreign residency and corporate strategic choice. It is found that controlling person's foreign residency significantly increases the firm's strategic aggressiveness, and this finding verifies the "speculative effect" hypothesis regarding controlling person's foreign residency. This result is still valid after controlling endogeneity and carrying out a series of robustness tests. Besides, China's efforts in tracking down overseas fugitives and the bilateral extradition treaties signed between China and other countries significantly reduce the impact of foreign residency on corporate strategy. Further research results show that when the controlling person indirectly controls the firm or holds a large control right, the impact of foreign residency on corporate strategic aggressiveness is more pronounced. Also, when the shareholding ratio of management or the proportion of independent directors is relatively low, foreign residency often leads to more aggressive corporate strategies. In addition, strict audit supervision and high accounting conservatism reduce the impact of foreign residency on corporate strategic aggressiveness. This research provides references for managers, investors and regulators to understand and ease the impact of foreign residencyon firms, and provides enlightenment for relevant departments to track down fugitives and carry out extradition cooperation.

Key words: foreign residency, corporate strategy, controlling person, private enterprises