管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (9): 75-88.

• 创新与创业管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑技术溢出效应的制造商投资升级供应商技术研究

董明1,2, 毛舜杰2, 李珊2   

  1. 1. 上海交通大学数字化管理决策教育部哲学社会科学实验室, 上海 200030;
    2. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院, 上海 200030
  • 收稿日期:2022-04-19 出版日期:2023-09-28 发布日期:2023-10-31
  • 通讯作者: 董明(通讯作者),上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院、上海交通大学数字化管理决策教育部哲学社会科学实验室教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 作者简介:毛舜杰,上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院硕士研究生;李珊,上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重点项目（23AZD017）。

Manufacturer's Investment to Upgrade Its Supplier's Technology with Consideration of Technology Spillover Effect

Dong Ming1,2, Mao Shunjie2, Li Shan2   

  1. 1. Data-Driven Management Decision Making Lab, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030;
    2. Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030
  • Received:2022-04-19 Online:2023-09-28 Published:2023-10-31

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摘要： 随着经济全球化和市场竞争的加剧，企业会联合上游企业，构建一条技术关系紧密的供应链。为保证供应链的稳定以及改进自身产品的质量，许多大型企业会通过直接投资升级供应商的生产设备或生产技术来改进产品质量或降低产品成本。当制造商直接投资升级供应商技术时，可能存在技术溢出效应，给其他横向竞争的制造商也带来好处。本文通过Stackelberg模型和完全且完美信息动态博弈研究制造商投资升级供应商技术的策略，以及潜在竞争者进入市场与制造商升级供应商技术之间的相互影响。研究表明：（1）如果制造商直接投资升级供应商技术，不论是否存在技术溢出效应，当产品单位生产成本较小时，都可以阻碍外部企业进入市场。（2）如果存在技术溢出效应，投资升级供应商技术会增加有横向竞争关系的其他企业的利润；如果不存在技术溢出效应，现有制造商直接投资升级供应商技术，会降低横向竞争的其他制造商企业的利润，甚至使得其他企业均衡产量降为零，阻碍潜在的竞争者进入市场。

关键词: 供应商技术升级, 技术溢出效应, 多主体博弈, Stackelberg模型

Abstract: With the intensification of economic globalization and market competition, companies will unite upstream companies to establish a closely-connected supply chain. To ensure the stability of the supply chain and improve the quality of their products, many large enterprises will directly invest in upgrading suppliers' production equipment or technology to improve product quality or reduce production costs. When manufacturers directly invest in upgrading suppliers' technology, there may exist technology spillover effects, which will bring benefits to other horizontally competing manufacturers. We use the Stackelberg model and complete and perfect information dynamic game to study the strategy of manufacturers' investing in upgrading supplier technology, and the interaction between potential competitors entering the market and manufacturers upgrading supplier's technology. The results show that:(1) If a manufacturer directly invests in upgrading its supplier's technology, when unit production cost is small, external companies will be hindered from entering the market, regardless of whether there is a technology spillover effect; (2) If there exists technology spillover effect, upgrading supplier's technology will increase the profits of other enterprises. If there is no technology spillover effect, the manufacturer's direct investment in upgrading the supplier's technology will reduce the profits of other manufacturers, even reduce the equilibrium output of other companies to zero, and hinder potential competitors from entering the market.

Key words: supplier's technology upgrading, technology spillover effect, multi-agent game, Stackelberg model