管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (6): 160-170.

• 电子商务与信息管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

电商平台自有品牌引入与定价时序选择

喻冬冬1,2, 罗春林1, 田歆3,4, 万谧宇5   

  1. 1. 江西财经大学信息管理学院, 南昌 330013;
    2. 南阳理工学院范蠡商学院, 南阳 473004;
    3. 中国科学院大学经济与管理学院, 北京 100190;
    4. 中国科学院虚拟经济与数据科学研究中心, 北京 100190;
    5. 华东交通大学交通运输与物流学院, 南昌 330013
  • 收稿日期:2021-03-15 发布日期:2023-07-27
  • 通讯作者: 罗春林(通讯作者),江西财经大学信息管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 作者简介:喻冬冬,江西财经大学信息管理学院博士研究生,南阳理工学院范蠡商学院讲师;田歆,中国科学院大学经济与管理学院副教授,中国科学院虚拟经济与数据科学研究中心副研究员,硕士生导师,博士;万谧宇,华东交通大学交通运输与物流学院讲师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目（71862014；71932002；71761015；71964014）；北京市自然科学基金项目（9212020）；江西省自然科学基金项目（20202BABL201012）；江西省研究生创新专项资金项目(YC2021-B128)。

E-commerce Platform Store Brand Introduction and Pricing Sequence Selection

Yu Dongdong1,2, Luo Chunlin1, Tian Xin3,4, Wan Miyu5   

  1. 1. School of Information Management, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013;
    2. School of Fanli Business, Nanyang Institute of Technology, Nanyang 473004;
    3. School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190;
    4. Research Center on Fictitious Economy and Data Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190;
    5. School of Transportation and Logistics, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang 330013
  • Received:2021-03-15 Published:2023-07-27

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摘要： 考虑到引入自有品牌已成为电商平台获取竞争优势的关键，针对两个竞争制造商和一个电商平台组成的在线销售系统，探讨不同定价时序对自有品牌引入策略的影响。研究表明：引入自有品牌具有竞争效应和价格效应，而且存在边界均衡，其中自有品牌的销售量可以忽略，但可以使得电商平台提升同上游企业的竞争力并获得批发价格优势，平台先行定价下的均衡区间更广；代销合约制造商倾向于自身先行定价，而电商平台和分销合约制造商可能有后动优势；随着引入自有品牌的固定成本上升，制造商对代销合约的偏好减弱。

关键词: 电商平台, 自有品牌, 定价时序, 竞争效应, 价格效应

Abstract: Store brand strategy has become crucial for e-commerce platforms to gain competitive advantage. This paper explores the impact of pricing sequence on store brand introduction in a supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers and one e-commerce platform. The results show that store brand introduction has competition effect and pricing effect, and there exists a boundary equilibrium, in which the sales volume of store brand is negligible, but its presence enables the e-commerce platform to enhance the competitiveness of upstream companies and obtain the wholesale price advantage. Moreover, the equilibrium may have a wider range when the e-commerce platform firstly sets retail price. The manufacturer who signs agency selling contract prefers to set retail price first, while the e-commerce platform and the manufacturer who sign reselling contract may have the second-mover advantage. As the fixed cost of introducing store brand increases, the manufacturers' preference for agency sales contracts decreases.

Key words: e-commerce platform, store brand, pricing sequence, competition effect, pricing effect