基于多种污染物损害和生态补偿的跨界污染合作治理策略研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于多种污染物(非累积性和累积性污染物)对环境造成差异化损害与生态补偿机制的视角,运用最优控制理论构建一个由受偿地区和补偿地区组成的两相邻地区间关于跨界污染最优控制博弈模型,分析两相邻地区间分别在Stackelberg非合作博弈、合作博弈这两种情况下的跨界污染治理策略,包括污染物排放量、治污投资以及生态补偿系数等,探讨污染物存量及治污投资存量的动态变化情况,并对这两种情况下的最优解进行比较分析。理论及仿真分析结果表明:Stackelberg非合作博弈下补偿方的最优生态补偿系数仅取决于两地区开展环境治理的收益情况,而与其他因素无关。然而,合作博弈下,每个地区均会考虑非累积性污染物对相邻地区造成的损失;每个地区将增加治污投资;合作剩余受累积性污染物存量损害及非累积性污染物对相邻地区损害的影响,但与非累积性污染物对本地损害无关。无论是Stackelberg非合作博弈还是合作博弈,污染物存量与治污投资存量均受其初始存量等因素的影响而呈多样化的动态路径。

关键词: 生态补偿, 合作治理, 跨界污染, 非累积性污染物, 累积性污染物

Abstract: From the perspective of multiple pollutants (non-cumulative and cumulative pollutants) causing different damage to the environment and ecological compensation mechanisms, the optimal control theory is used to construct a game model of optimal control of transboundary pollution in two adjacent areas composed of the acceptance area and the compensation area. The strategies of environmental pollution control under Stackelberg non-cooperative game and cooperative game are analyzed, including pollutant emission, investment in environmental pollution control and ecological compensation coefficient. At the same time, the dynamic changes of pollutant stock and investment stock of environmental pollution control are discussed, and the optimal solutions in these two cases are compared and analyzed. The theoretical and simulation analysis results show that the optimal ecological compensation coefficient of the compensation area under the Stackelberg game only depends on the income of environmental management in these two regions, but has nothing to do with other factors. However, under the cooperative game, each region will consider the losses caused by its non-cumulative pollutant emission to its neighbors, and the region will increase investment in environmental pollution control. The cooperative surplus is affected by the damage of cumulative pollutants stock and the damage of non-cumulative pollutants to adjacent areas, but it is not related to the damage of noncumulative pollutants to its own area. Whether it is Stackelberg non-cooperative game or cooperative game, the pollutant stock and pollution control investment stock are affected by their initial stock and other factors, showing a diversified dynamic path.

Key words: ecological compensation, cooperative governance, transboundary pollution, non-accumulative pollutants, accumulative pollutants

凌星元, 孟卫东, 黄波. 基于多种污染物损害和生态补偿的跨界污染合作治理策略研究[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(12): 288-301.

Ling Xingyuan, Meng Weidong, Huang Bo. Research on Cooperative Governance Strategy of Transboundary Pollution Based on Multiple Pollutants Damage and Ecological Compensation[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(12): 288-301.

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