控股股东缺失、公司治理与高质量审计

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 上市公司控股股东缺失是新出现的现象。没有控股股东时,股东如何解决经理代理问题成为公司治理的重大议题。本文从需求视角分析了控股股东缺失与高质量审计的关系,研究发现:(1)控股股东缺失会产生对高审计质量的需求,公司倾向于聘请“四大”审计,也倾向于支付更多的审计费用。(2)在影响路径上,控股股东缺失会削弱股东自身监督效果,促使股东对外部高质量审计监督产生需求。(3)经理权力作为公司治理机制的一种,会影响控股股东缺失与高质量审计之间的关系,抑制控股股东缺失对高质量审计的需求;法律保护作为外部治理机制之一,也会抑制控股股东缺失对高质量审计的需求,表明法律保护对于股东而言,是高质量审计的替代性机制之一。(4)进一步分析发现,多个大股东并不是控股股东缺失影响高质量审计的其他机制,经理股权激励则能够成为控股股东缺失时的补充机制。

关键词: 控股股东, 缺失, 公司治理, 高质量审计

Abstract: There is a new phenomenon that listed companies do not have ultimate owners. Solving the managers agency problem becomes a key issue for corporate shareholders when there is no monitoring from ultimate owners. This paper examines the effect of ultimate owners’ in-existence on high audit quality. The results show that the in-existence of ultimate owners could cause high probability of Big4 auditing and more audit fees. The effect passes on in such a manner that the in-existence of ultimate owners weakens shareholders’ self monitoring and then results in their demand for high quality auditing outside. About the cross-section, this paper finds institutional investor and financial development can be mediators between the in-existence of ultimate owners and high audit quality. This paper also compares multiple large shareholders and management equity incentive’s in terms of their respective effect on high-quality auditing and concludes the former is ineffective but the latter is effective.

Key words: ultimate owner, in-existence, corporate governance, high quality audit

章琳一. 控股股东缺失、公司治理与高质量审计[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(12): 276-287.

Zhang Linyi. The In-existence of Ultimate Owner, Corporate Governance and High Quality Audit[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(12): 276-287.

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