信息优势还是利益冲突：关联分析师盈余预测行为研究——基于股权质押的经验证据

管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (6): 15-26.

信息优势还是利益冲突：关联分析师盈余预测行为研究——基于股权质押的经验证据

张晨宇¹, 钱爱民²

1. 北京工商大学商学院, 北京 100048;
2. 对外经济贸易大学国际商学院, 北京 100029

收稿日期:2019-07-12 出版日期:2022-06-28 发布日期:2022-07-22
通讯作者: 张晨宇(通讯作者),北京工商大学商学院副教授,博士。
作者简介:钱爱民,对外经济贸易大学国际商学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目（71902006）；北京市教委科研计划资助项目（SM202010011007）；北京工商大学国有资产管理协同创新中心开放课题基金资助课题（GZGL-KFKT-2019-02）。

Information Superiority or Interest Conflicts: The Effect of Share Pledge on Affiliated Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

Zhang Chenyu¹, Qian Aimin²

1. Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048;
2. Business School, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029

Received:2019-07-12 Online:2022-06-28 Published:2022-07-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文将因隶属券商开展股权质押业务与上市公司形成关联关系的分析师(分析师-券商-股权质押公司)界定为关联分析师，并在此基础上系统地考察关联分析师的盈余预测行为。研究发现，关联分析师的盈余预测偏差更大、精度更低，这一盈余预测行为并未因信息优势和其他关联关系剔除而改善，且与股权质押类型、融资资金去向无关，表明关联分析师因利益冲突发布了乐观性盈余预测报告，研究结论支持利益冲突假说。而且，关联分析师的利益冲突行为在股权质押率高、券商风险管理能力较差时更为突出。股权质押影响关联分析师利益冲突的作用路径是分析师私有信息获取和券商业务拓展需求，导致关联分析师与股权质押公司、隶属券商间的双重利益冲突。本文从质押权人视角丰富了股权质押经济后果研究文献，研究结论有助于增进分析师盈余预测行为的理解。

关键词: 关联分析师, 盈余预测, 股权质押, 利益冲突, 信息优势

Abstract: This paper studies the behaviour of earnings forecasts of affiliated analysts,whose brokers are pledgees of listed firms and related to share pledge firms.Using the data from 2013 to 2017,we find that the earnings forecasts issued by affiliated analysts are less accurate as they tend to issue biased research reports on share pledge firms,and the finding supports the hypothesis of interest conflicts.Moreover,the interest conflicts behaviour of affiliated analysts is more significant in the sample with high equity pledge ratio and poor risk management ability of securities companies.The impact of share pledge on interest conflict of affiliated analysts starts from affiliated analysts' need to acquire private information from share pledge firms and help their securities companies thus resulting in the double interest conflicts that affiliated analysts face with share pledge firms and affiliated securities companies respectively.Overall,this study contributes to the researches on the economic consequences of share pledge,and helps us better understand the earnings forecast behaviour under the interest conflict from the perspective of share pledge.

Key words: affiliated analysts, analysts' earnings forecasts, share pledge, interest conflicts, information superiority

张晨宇, 钱爱民. 信息优势还是利益冲突：关联分析师盈余预测行为研究——基于股权质押的经验证据[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(6): 15-26.

Zhang Chenyu, Qian Aimin. Information Superiority or Interest Conflicts: The Effect of Share Pledge on Affiliated Analysts' Earnings Forecasts[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(6): 15-26.

参考文献

[1] Anderson R., Puleo M. Insider Share-pledging and Firm Risk[J]. Journal of Financial Services Research, 2020,58(1):1-25
[2] Huang Z., Xue Q. Re-examination of the Effect of Ownership Structure on Financial Reporting:Evidence from Share Pledges in China[J]. China Journal of Accounting Research, 2016,9(2):137-152
[3] 谢德仁,郑登津,崔宸瑜.控股股东股权质押是潜在"地雷"吗?——基于股价崩盘风险视角的研究[J].管理世界, 2016,32(3):128-140
[4] 王雄元,欧阳才越,史震阳.股权质押、控制权转移风险与税收规避[J].经济研究, 2018,53(1):138-152
[5] 钱爱民,张晨宇.股权质押与信息披露策略[J].会计研究, 2018,(12):34-40
[6] 廖珂,崔宸瑜,谢德仁.控股股东股权质押与上市公司股利政策选择[J].金融研究, 2018,(4):172-189
[7] Hong H., Kubik J. Analyzing the Analysts:Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2003,58(1):313-351
[8] Chen S., Matsumoto D. Upgrades vs Downgrades:The Impact on Access to Information and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2006,44(4):657-689
[9] Ke B., Yu Y. The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2006,44(5):965-999
[10] Jackson A. R. Trade Generation, Reputation, and Sell-side Analysts[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2005,60(2):673-711
[11] Stickel S. E. Reputation and Performance among Security Analysts[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1992,47(5):1811-1836
[12] O'Brien P. C., Mcnichols M. F., Lin H. W. Analyst Impartiality and Investment Banking Relationships[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2005,43(4):623-650
[13] Mola S., Guidolin M. Affiliated Mutual Funds and Analyst Optimism[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2009,93(1):108-137
[14] 曹胜,朱红军.王婆贩瓜:券商自营业务与分析师乐观性[J].管理世界, 2011,27(7):20-30
[15] Hunton J., McEwen R. An Assessment of the Relation between Analysts' Earnings Forecast Accuracy, Motivational Incentives and Cognitive Information Search Strategy[J]. The Accounting Review, 1997,72(4):497-515
[16] Lin H., McNichols M. Underwriting Relationships, Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1998,25(1):101-127
[17] Lin H., McNichols M., O'Brien P. C. Analyst Impartiality and Investment Banking Relations[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2005,43(4):623-650
[18] 熊礼慧,朱新蓉,李言.股权质押与股市风险研究——兼论股价波动风险与极端市场风险[J].财贸经济, 2021,42(10):87-101
[19] 华鸣,孙谦.大股东股权质押与券商分析师——监督动力还是利益冲突?[J].投资研究, 2017,36(11):94-115
[20] 黄登仕,黄禹舜,周嘉南.控股股东股权质押影响上市公司"高送转"吗?[J].管理科学学报, 2018,21(12):18-36
[21] 何威风,李思昊,周子露.控股股东股权质押与股份回购[J].中国软科学, 2021,(7):106-119
[22] Chan K., Chen H. K., Hu S., et al. Share Pledges and Margin Call Pressure[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2018,52:96-117
[23] 胡聪慧,朱菲菲,邱卉敏.股权质押、风险管理与大股东增持[J].金融研究, 2020,(9):190-206
[24] 潘越,戴亦一,刘思超.我国承销商利用分析师报告托市了吗?[J].经济研究, 2011,46(3):131-144
[25] 赵良玉,李增泉,刘军霞.管理层偏好、投资评级乐观性与私有信息获取[J].管理世界, 2013,29(4):33-46
[26] 原红旗,黄倩茹.承销商分析师与非承销商分析师预测评级比较研究[J].中国会计评论, 2007,5(3):285-304
[27] Dugar A., Nathan S. The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships on Financial Analysts' Forecasts and Investment Recommendations[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1995,12(1):131-160
[28] Dambra M., Field L. C., Gustafson M. T., et al. The Consequences to Analyst Involvement in the IPO Process:Evidence Surrounding the JOBS Act[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2018,65(2-3):302-330
[29] Cowen A., Groysberg B., Healy P. Which Type of Analyst Firms Are More Optimistic?[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2006,41(1-2):119-146
[30] Gu Z., Li Z., Yang Y. G., et al. Friends in Need Are Friends Indeed:An Analysis of Social Ties between Financial Analysts and Mutual Fund Managers[J]. The Accounting Review, 2019,94(1):153-181
[31] Gu Z., Li Z., Yang Y. G. Monitors or Predators:The Influence of Institutional Investors on Sell-side Analysts[J]. The Accounting Review, 2013,88(1):137-169
[32] 伊志宏,申丹琳,江轩宇.基金股权关联分析师损害了股票市场信息效率吗?——基于股价同步性的经验证据[J].管理评论, 2018,30(8):3-15
[33] Cheng Q., Du F., Wang X., et al. Seeing Is Believing:Analysts' Corporate Site Visits[J]. The Review of Accounting Studies, 2016,21(4):1245-1286
[34] Mayew W., Sharp N. Y., Venkatachalam M. Using Earnings Conference Calls to Identity Analysts with Superior Private Information[J]. The Review of Accounting Studies, 2013,18(2):386-413
[35] Malloy C. J. The Geography of Equity Analysis[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2005,60(2):719-755
[36] Bae H. K., Stulz R. M., Tan H. Do Local Analysts Know More?A Cross-country Study of the Performance of Local Analysts and Foreign Analysts[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008,88(3):581-606
[37] O'Brien P. C., Tan H. Geographic Proximity and Analyst Coverage Decisions:Evidence from IPOs[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2015,59(1):41-59
[38] 张然,王会娟,张路.本地优势、信息披露质量和分析师预测准确性[J].中国会计评论, 2012,10(2):127-138
[39] 林晚发,刘颖斐,赵仲匡.承销商评级与债券信用利差——来自《证券公司分类监管规定》的经验证据[J].中国工业经济, 2019,(1):174-192
[40] 黄俊,黄超,位豪强,等.卖空机制提高了分析师盈余预测质量吗?——基于融资融券制度的经验证据[J].南开管理评论, 2018,21(2):135-148