审计委员会透明度与会计信息质量——基于履职情况披露的经验证据

管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (1): 255-267.

审计委员会透明度与会计信息质量——基于履职情况披露的经验证据

陈汉文, 王金妹, 刘思义, 杨道广

对外经济贸易大学国际商学院, 北京 100029

收稿日期:2019-12-26 出版日期:2022-01-28 发布日期:2022-02-25
通讯作者: 刘思义(通讯作者),对外经济贸易大学国际商学院讲师,博士。
作者简介:陈汉文,对外经济贸易大学国际商学院教授,博士生导师,博士;王金妹,对外经济贸易大学国际商学院博士研究生;杨道广,对外经济贸易大学国际商学院讲师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金重大项目（71790604）；国家自然科学基金重点项目（71932003）；国家自然科学基金青年项目（71702030；71902030；71902026；71902033）。

Audit Committee Transparency and Accounting Information Quality——Empirical Evidence Based on Performance Disclosure

Chen Hanwen, Wang Jinmei, Liu Siyi, Yang Daoguang

International Business School, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029

Received:2019-12-26 Online:2022-01-28 Published:2022-02-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 近年来，投资者日益高涨的信息需求与审计委员会透明度不足间的矛盾愈发凸显，而监管改革的一个重要争议是加强审计委员会信息披露的收益与成本如何平衡。基于此，本文利用上交所2013年有关审计委员会履职信息强制披露规定的准自然实验，围绕会计信息质量视角实证检验了审计委员会透明度的收益。研究发现：审计委员会透明度的提高显著提升了企业会计信息质量，且该效应在错报风险和代理成本较高的公司中更加显著；进一步，审计委员会透明度的提高通过促进审计委员会的履职有效性，进而提高了企业会计信息质量。本研究结论从会计信息质量视角证实了提高审计委员会透明度的收益，为各国正在探索的审计委员会透明度监管改革提供了支持性的经验证据。

关键词: 审计委员会, 透明度, 会计信息质量, 监管改革

Abstract: In recent years, the contradiction between the increasing information demand of investors and the lack of transparency of the audit committee has become increasingly prominent, and an important controversy over regulatory reform is how to balance the benefits and costs of audit committee information disclosure. Based on that, this paper empirically tests the benefits of audit committee transparency from the perspective of accounting information quality by using the quasi-natural experiment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange mandatory disclosure of audit committee work information in 2013. Empirical evidence shows that the improvement of audit committee transparency has significantly improved the quality of corporate accounting information, and this effect is more pronounced in companies with higher misstatement risks and agency costs; further, the improvement of audit committee transparency improves the quality of accounting information by promoting the effectiveness of audit committee performance. The conclusion confirms the benefits of audit committee transparency from the perspective of accounting information quality, and provides supporting empirical evidence for the supervision reform of audit committee transparency being explored in various countries.

Key words: audit committee, transparency, accounting information quality, regulatory reform

陈汉文, 王金妹, 刘思义, 杨道广. 审计委员会透明度与会计信息质量——基于履职情况披露的经验证据[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(1): 255-267.

Chen Hanwen, Wang Jinmei, Liu Siyi, Yang Daoguang. Audit Committee Transparency and Accounting Information Quality——Empirical Evidence Based on Performance Disclosure[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(1): 255-267.

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