碳税视角下最优排放实施与企业减排投资竞争

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (8): 17-28.

碳税视角下最优排放实施与企业减排投资竞争

王明喜¹, 胡毅², 郭冬梅³, 曹杰⁴

1. 对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院, 北京 100029;
2. 中国科学院大学经济与管理学院, 北京 100190;
3. 中央财经大学经济学院, 北京 100081;
4. 徐州工程学院, 徐州 221018

收稿日期:2018-07-18 出版日期:2021-08-28 发布日期:2021-09-04
通讯作者: 胡毅(通讯作者),中国科学院大学经济与管理学院副教授
作者简介:王明喜,对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院教授;郭冬梅,中央财经大学经济学院教授;曹杰,徐州工程学院教授。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目（71971062）；对外经济贸易大学优秀青年学者资助项目（18YQ02）；江苏高校哲学社会科学优秀创新团队项目（2015ZSTD006）；北京市自然科学基金项目（9202015）。

Optimal Emissions Implementation and Enterprises' Abatement Investment Competition under the Carbon Tax Tool

Wang Mingxi¹, Hu Yi², Guo Dongmei³, Cao Jie⁴

1. School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029;
2. School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190;
3. School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081;
4. Xuzhou University of Technology, Xuzhou 221018

Received:2018-07-18 Online:2021-08-28 Published:2021-09-04

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 新常态经济发展阶段对我国低碳转型提出新的挑战，客观要求政府职能部门必须进行减排政策创新，由此催生了市场化减排工具——碳税正式进入我国税法体系，并引起学术界热议。本文创新性地把地方政府作为一个独立博弈方，纳入“国家-企业”博弈模型，发现地方政府的个体碳排放决策行为严格偏离国家整体层面的最优排放决策水平。为矫正地方政府的非最优决策行为，在考虑碳排放的环境外部性特征基础上，提出差异税率碳税政策的征收依据。进而分析征收碳税对微观生产企业减排投资和市场竞争的影响。结果显示：对于减排成本较低的企业，碳税政策不但可以矫正地方政府碳排放的非最优行为，提升企业减排投资积极性，有效降低企业碳基能源的消耗，还可以增强企业产品的市场竞争力，改善消费者福利；对于减排成本较高的企业，碳税政策是一把双刃剑，抑制企业的减排投资和低碳研发，尤其是高能耗企业，但是碳税政策的长期实施则有利于我国低碳经济转型。最后，基于文中结论，提出对应的政策建议。

关键词: 碳税, 最优碳排放, 减排投资

Abstract: China's economic development has entered a new normal, meaning Chinese low-carbon transition meets new challenges. This implies that the Chinese government must seek a suitable policy option to solve such challenges. In this setting, the carbon tax, as a market-based emission reduction measurement, formally got into China's tax law system and became a research focus in the academic area. In this paper, the regional government, being taken as an independent player, is introduced into the state-enterprise game model. It is found that the individual emission decision level of the regional government strictly deviates from the optimal emission of the whole nation. To correct the non optimal decision-making behavior of the regional government, this paper puts forward an alternative carbon tax policy with differential tax rate on the basis of the carbon emission externality. Moreover, the effects of the carbon tax on enterprises' abatement investment and product competition are examined, respectively. The results show that:for the enterprise with low emission reduction cost, the carbon tax can not only correct the non optimal emission behavior of the regional government, but also encourage enterprises to invest in emission abatement and reduce the consumption of carbon-based energy, and improve the market competitiveness of enterprise products as well; yet, for the enterprise with high emission reduction cost, the carbon tax tool is a double-edged sword, restraining the abatement investment of the enterprise, especially high energy consumption enterprises; but, the long-term implementation of the carbon tax policy is conducive to the low-carbon transition of China's economy. Finally, based on the results, some policy recommendations are suggested.

Key words: carbon tax, optimal carbon emission, abatement investment

王明喜, 胡毅, 郭冬梅, 曹杰. 碳税视角下最优排放实施与企业减排投资竞争[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(8): 17-28.

Wang Mingxi, Hu Yi, Guo Dongmei, Cao Jie. Optimal Emissions Implementation and Enterprises' Abatement Investment Competition under the Carbon Tax Tool[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(8): 17-28.

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