管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (1): 322-329.

• 公共管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

公共文化服务“项目制”合作治理主体决策及逻辑冲突

吴正泓1, 陈通2, 侯光辉2   

  1. 1. 中国民航大学经济与管理学院, 天津 300300;
    2. 天津大学管理与经济学部, 天津 300072
  • 收稿日期:2017-05-22 出版日期:2021-01-28 发布日期:2021-02-03
  • 作者简介:吴正泓,中国民航大学经济与管理学院讲师;陈通,天津大学管理与经济学部教授,博士生导师;侯光辉,天津大学管理与经济学部博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(3122020009)。

Decision Making of Collaborative Governance Subjects and Logical Conflict of Public Cultural Service Projects

Wu Zhenghong1, Chen Tong2, Hou Guanghui2   

  1. 1. Economics and Management College, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin 300300;
    2. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072
  • Received:2017-05-22 Online:2021-01-28 Published:2021-02-03

摘要: 基于“项目制”视角,阐释公共文化服务“项目制”合作治理机制,运用演化博弈模型研究公众参与和未参与情形下公共文化服务长期供给过程中公私部门决策过程,并进行数值模拟。结果表明:治理性收益、投机收益和公众惩罚的大小是影响公私部门演化稳定策略选择的关键。阐述了公共文化服务“项目制”合作治理过程中的中央主导逻辑与地方自主逻辑、迎检逻辑与服务逻辑的冲突,通过案例对比分析,分别从增加公共文化服务经营性属性、优化政府补贴方式、引入公众监督机制和提升监督意识以及加大监督惩罚力度和提高治理资源四个方面提出相关对策。

关键词: 公共文化, 项目制, 合作治理, 演化博弈

Abstract: From the project perspective, the collaborative governance mechanism of the project is described, and an evolutionary game model is used to study public and private sectors decision-making process in the long-term provision process of public cultural services with and without public participation. The results show that the value of governance gains, speculative gains and public penalties are the key to influence the public and private sectors to choose the ESS. The logical conflicts which are the national dominant versus the local autonomy, and the bureaucratic performance-oriented versus the demand-oriented are described through the case analysis. The following countermeasures are proposed:increasing the profitable attributes of public cultural services, optimizing the way of government subsidies, introducing public supervision mechanism, enhancing the supervision awareness of the public, increasing the intensity of penalties and raising governance gains.

Key words: public culture, project system, collaborative governance, evolutionary game