反收购条款、股价同步性与投资效率

管理评论 ›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (11): 33-47.

反收购条款、股价同步性与投资效率

邓伟¹, 王涛¹, 成园园²

1. 南京财经大学金融学院, 南京 210046;
2. 国融证券股份有限公司, 北京 100031

收稿日期:2017-09-25 出版日期:2020-11-28 发布日期:2020-12-05
作者简介:邓伟,南京财经大学金融学院教授,硕士生导师,博士;王涛,南京财经大学金融学院硕士研究生;成园园,国融证券股份有限公司。

Anti-takeover Provision, Synchronicity of Stock Price and Investment Efficiency

Deng Wei¹, Wang Tao¹, Cheng Yuanyuan²

1. School of Finance, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjin 210046;
2. Guorong Securities Co., Ltd., Beijing 100031

Received:2017-09-25 Online:2020-11-28 Published:2020-12-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文采用中国A股2008—2015年上市公司的数据，考察了上市公司的反收购条款如何影响股价同步性，进而影响公司的投资效率。实证结果首先表明，公司的反收购条款越多，股价同步性就越高，投资效率也就越低。也就是说，反收购条款会通过减少股价信息对公司的反馈作用而降低投资效率。然后本文再分别按照股权集中度和实际控制人性质分组比较后发现，反收购条款的上述作用在股权集中度低、民营企业中更大。

关键词: 反收购条款, 股价同步性, 股价信息含量, 投资效率, 中介效应检验

Abstract: Based on the data of listed companies in China from 2008 to 2015, this paper discusses how the anti - takeover terms of listed companies can influence the investment efficiency of the company through the market feedback of stock price synchronization. The empirical results of this paper first show that the less the reverse acquisition terms, the lower the share price synchronization, the more information on the price information, and thus feed back to the management of more valuable information and make efficient investment decisions. Furthermore, according to the comparison of the concentration of ownership and the nature of the actual controller, it is found that the above-mentioned role of the anti-takeover clauses is lower in the concentration of the stock, and the private enterprise is bigger.

Key words: anti-takeover provision, synchronicity of stock price, information content of stock price, investment efficiency, mediation effect test

邓伟, 王涛, 成园园. 反收购条款、股价同步性与投资效率[J]. 管理评论, 2020, 32(11): 33-47.

Deng Wei, Wang Tao, Cheng Yuanyuan. Anti-takeover Provision, Synchronicity of Stock Price and Investment Efficiency[J]. Management Review, 2020, 32(11): 33-47.

参考文献

[1] Gompers P. A., Ishii J., Metrick A. Corporate Governance and Equity Prices[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003,118(1):107-156
[2] Souther M. E. The Effects of Takeover Defenses:Evidence from Closed-end Funds[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2016,119(2):420-440
[3] Stein J. C. Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1988,96(1):61-80
[4] Cremers M., Litov L. P., Sepe S. M. Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2017,126(2):422-444
[5] Sanjeev B. J., Partha S., Suning Zh. Takeover Defenses:Entrenchment and Efficiency[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017,63(1):142-160
[6] Sokolyk T. The Effects of Antitakeover Provisions on Acquisition Targets[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011,17(3):612-627
[7] Straska M., Waller H. G. Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth:A Survey of the Literature[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2014,49(4):933-956
[8] Kadyrzhanova D., Rhodes-Kropf M. Concentrating on Governance[J]. Journal of Finance, 2011,66(5):1649-1685
[9] Morck R., Yeung B., Yu W. The Information Content of Stock Markets:Why do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000,58(1-2):215-260
[10] Jin L., Myers S. C. R2 around the World:New Theory and New Tests[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006,79(2):257-292
[11] Ferreira M. A., Laux P. A. Corporate Governance, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Information Flow[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2007,62(2):951-989
[12] Chen Q., Goldstein I., Jiang W. Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2007,20(3):619-650
[13] Leuz C., Nanda D., Wysocki P. D. Earnings Management and Investor Protection:An International Comparison[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002,69(3):505-527
[14] Baber W. R., Kang S., Liang L., et al. External Corporate Governance and Misreporting[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2015,32(4):1413-1442
[15] 韩晴,王华. 独立董事责任险、机构投资者与公司治理[J]. 南开管理评论, 2014,17(5):54-62
[16] 王立章,王咏梅,王志诚. 控制权、现金流权与股价同步性[J]. 金融研究, 2016,(5):97-110
[17] Hayek F. A. The Use of Knowledge in Society[J]. American Economic Review, 1945,35(4):519-530
[18] Baker M., Stein J. C. Wurgle J. When does the Market Matter? Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003,118(3):969-1005
[19] 伊志宏,姜付秀,秦义虎. 产品市场竞争、公司治理与信息披露质量[J]. 管理世界, 2010,(1):133-141
[20] 方军雄. 政府干预、所有权性质与企业并购[J]. 管理世界, 2008,(9):118-148
[21] 曹春方,马连福,沈小秀. 财政压力、晋升压力、官员任期与地方国企过度投资[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2014,13(7):1415-1436
[22] Richardson S. Over-investment of Free Cash Flow[J]. Review of Accounting Studies, 2006,11(2):159-189
[23] 温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等. 中介效应检验程序及其应用[J]. 心理学报, 2004,36(5):614-620
[24] Durnev A., Morck R., Yeung B. Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2004,59(1):65-105