基于委托代理理论的PPP项目风险成本研究

管理评论 ›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (9): 45-54,67.

基于委托代理理论的PPP项目风险成本研究

宋子健¹, 董纪昌¹, 李秀婷¹, 董志²

1. 中国科学院大学经济与管理学院, 北京 100190;
2. 中国科学院大学创新创业学院, 北京 100190

收稿日期:2018-02-23 出版日期:2020-09-28 发布日期:2020-09-30
通讯作者: 董纪昌(通讯作者),中国科学院大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士
作者简介:宋子健,中国科学院大学经济与管理学院博士研究生;李秀婷,中国科学院大学经济与管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士;董志,中国科学院大学创新创业学院讲师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金应急管理项目（71850014）；国家自然科学基金重点项目（71532013）；国家自然科学基金面上项目（71573244）。

Research on Risk Cost of Public-Private-Partnership Project Based on Principal-Agent Theory

Song Zijian¹, Dong Jichang¹, Li Xiuting¹, Dong Zhi²

1. School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190;
2. School of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190

Received:2018-02-23 Online:2020-09-28 Published:2020-09-30

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 近年来，政府和社会资本合作（Public-Private-Partnership，PPP）模式受到国家高度重视并得到大力推广，项目规模迅速扩大的同时也出现了项目风险难以度量、风险分担机制不合理等弊端。本文结合PPP项目特点，首先对政府与社会资本双方之间的委托代理关系进行分析，厘清PPP项目风险成本测算的影响因素，对一般意义、信息对称和信息不对称三种情况下的风险成本测算模型进行求解和分析，通过引入实际案例来对模型进行检验，最后根据结果提出引入声誉机制、建立可用性付费和运营维护服务费与绩效考核结果完全挂钩等措施来降低项目风险成本，切实推动PPP项目规范发展。

关键词: 政府和社会资本合作(PPP), 委托代理, 风险成本, 绩效考核

Abstract: In recent years, the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) has been highly valued by the state and has been vigorously promoted. While the scale of PPP projects has expanded rapidly, there have been disadvantages, such as the difficulty of measuring project risks and the unreasonable risk sharing mechanism. Combining the characteristics of PPP projects, this paper first analyzes the principal-agent relationship between the government and social capital, and clarifies the influencing factors of PPP project risk cost calculations. This paper further constructs the risk cost measurement model under the two situations of information symmetry and information asymmetry and solves and analyzes the model. Then this paper verifies the model through an actual case and finally puts forward measures such as introducing a reputation mechanism, establishing availability payment and operation and maintenance service fees fully linked to performance evaluation results to reduce project risk costs, and finally promote the standardized development of PPP projects.

Key words: public-private-partnership (PPP), principal-agent, risk cost, performance appraisal

宋子健, 董纪昌, 李秀婷, 董志. 基于委托代理理论的PPP项目风险成本研究[J]. 管理评论, 2020, 32(9): 45-54,67.

Song Zijian, Dong Jichang, Li Xiuting, Dong Zhi. Research on Risk Cost of Public-Private-Partnership Project Based on Principal-Agent Theory[J]. Management Review, 2020, 32(9): 45-54,67.

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