党组织嵌入与民营企业财务违规

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 近年来，党组织嵌入民营企业已经成为不可忽视的政治经济现象，但民营企业中的党组织是否发挥作用仍是一个被学术界忽略的问题。本文基于手工搜集的民营上市公司党组织的数据，从企业财务违规这一视角检验党组织嵌入的经济后果。结果发现，党组织嵌入显著抑制了民营企业的违规行为，其可能的机制是增强高管对组织的参与度和重视程度。进一步，这种抑制作用在高管是党员、高管存在政治关联和处于政治敏感期时更加显著；这种抑制作用也在代理成本更高、信息环境更差、融资约束更大的公司里更加显著。上述结果在控制了可能的内生性问题后依然成立。结论显示党组织嵌入民营企业有助于促进其改善公司治理，为中国特色的公司治理制度的完善和十九大提出的“加强基层党组织建设”的系列改革提供了重要启示。

关键词: 党组织嵌入, 财务违规, 民营企业

Abstract: In recent years, the organization embedded in private enterprises has become a political and economic phenomenon that cannot be ignored. However, the role of the organization in private enterprises is still a neglected aspect in the academic circle. Based on the manually collected data of organization activities, this paper examines the economic consequences of the embedding of organizations from the perspective of corporate financial irregularities. The result shows that the organization embedding has significantly restrained the non-compliance of the private enterprises, and its possible mechanism is to enhance the participation and attention of the senior executives to the organization. Furthermore, this relationship is more pronounced when executives are Party members, politically connected and during politically sensitive year; This relationship is also more pronounced in companies with higher agency costs, poorer information environments and greater financing constraints. The above results are still valid after controlling the possible endogenous problems. The conclusion shows that the organization embedded in private enterprises can help improve corporate governance and provide important inspiration for the reform of “strengthening the grassroots organization construction” proposed by the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

Key words: organization embedding, financial violation, private enterprise

郑登津, 袁薇, 邓祎璐. 党组织嵌入与民营企业财务违规[J]. 管理评论, 2020, 32(8): 228-243,253.

Zheng Dengjin, Yuan Wei, Deng Yilu. Organization Embedding and Financial Violation[J]. Management Review, 2020, 32(8): 228-243,253.

参考文献

[1] Chang E. C., Wong S. M. Political Control and Performance in China's Listed Firms[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2004,32(4):617-636
[2] Campbell D. E. A Matter of Faith:Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election[M]. Washington, DC:Brookings Institution Press, 2007
[3] 马连福,王元芳,沈小秀. 国有企业党组织治理、冗余雇员与高管薪酬契约[J]. 管理世界, 2013,(5):100-115
[4] 马连福,王元芳,沈小秀. 中国国有企业党组织治理效应研究——基于"内部人控制"的视角[J]. 中国工业经济, 2012,(8):82-95
[5] 王元芳,马连福. 国有企业党组织能降低代理成本吗?——基于"内部人控制"的视角[J]. 管理评论, 2014,26(10):138-151
[6] 陈仕华,卢昌荣. 国有企业党组织的治理参与能够有效抑制并购中的"国有资产流失"吗?[J]. 管理世界, 2014,(5):106-120
[7] 梁建,陈爽英,盖庆恩. 民营企业的政治参与、治理结构与慈善捐赠[J]. 管理世界, 2010,(7):109-118
[8] 龙小宁,杨进. 党组织、工人福利和企业绩效:来自中国民营企业的证据[J]. 经济学报, 2014,(2):150-169
[9] 逯东,谢璇,杨丹. 独立董事官员背景类型与上市公司违规研究[J]. 会计研究, 2017,(8):55-61
[10] Fisman R. Estimating the Value of Political Connections[J]. The American Economic Review, 2001,91(4):1095-1102
[11] 陈德球,陈运森,董志勇. 政策不确定性、市场竞争与资本配置[J]. 金融研究, 2017,(11):65-80
[12] Nordhaus W. D. The Political Business Cycle[J]. The Review of Economic Studies, 1975,42(2):169-190
[13] Barro R. J. Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990,98(5):103-125
[14] Goldman E., Rocholl J., So J. Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?[J]. The Review of Financial Studies, 2009,22(6):2331-2360
[15] Julio B., Yook Y. Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2012,67(1):45-83
[16] Jens C. E. Political Uncertainty and Investment:Causal Evidence from U.S. Gubernatorial Elections[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2017,124(3):563-579
[17] 张军,高远. 官员任期、异地交流与经济增长——来自省级经验的证据[J]. 经济研究, 2007,(11):91-103
[18] 程博,宣扬,潘飞. 国有企业党组织治理的信号传递效应——基于审计师选择的分析[J]. 财经研究, 2017,43(3):69-80
[19] Li H., Meng L., Wang Q., et al. Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance:Evidence from Chinese Private Firms[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2008,87(2):283-299
[20] 戴亦一,余威,宁博,等. 民营企业董事长的党员身份与公司财务违规[J]. 会计研究, 2017,(6):75-81
[21] Povel P., Winton A. Booms, Busts, and Fraud[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2007,20(4):1219-1254
[22] Wang T. Y., Winton A., Yu X. Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions:Evidence from IPOs[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2010,65(6):2255-2292
[23] 滕飞,辛宇,顾小龙. 产品市场竞争与上市公司违规[J]. 会计研究, 2016,(9):32-40
[24] 姚宏,贾娓,郝小玉,等. 产品市场竞争、董事会结构变化与盈余管理[J]. 管理评论, 2018,30(4):194-205
[25] 周开国,应千伟,钟畅. 媒体监督能够起到外部治理的作用吗?——来自中国上市公司违规的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2016,(6):193-206
[26] 马壮,李延喜,王云,等. 媒体监督、异常审计费用与企业盈余管理[J]. 管理评论, 2018,30(4):219-234
[27] 张婷婷,李延喜,曾伟强. 媒体关注下上市公司盈余管理行为的差异研究——一种治理盈余管理的新途径[J]. 管理评论, 2018,30(2):25-41
[28] 陈克兢. 媒体监督、法治水平与上市公司盈余管理[J]. 管理评论, 2017,29(7):3-18
[29] 曹春方,陈露兰,张婷婷. "法律的名义":司法独立性提升与公司违规[J]. 金融研究, 2017,(5):191-206
[30] 魏志华,李常青,曾爱民,等. 关联交易、管理层权力与公司违规——兼论审计监督的治理作用[J]. 审计研究, 2017,(5):87-95
[31] 刘立国,杜莹. 公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究[J]. 会计研究, 2003,(2):28-37
[32] 梁杰,王璇,李进中. 现代公司治理结构与会计舞弊关系的实证研究[J]. 南开管理评论, 2004,7(6):47-51
[33] 计小青,曹啸. 上市公司虚假信息披露行为影响因素的实证研究[J]. 经济管理, 2004,22(22):89-96
[34] 蔡志岳,吴世农. 我国上市公司信息披露违规的预警研究——基于财务、市场和治理视角[J]. 管理评论, 2007,19(1):25-33
[35] 张程睿,蹇静. 我国上市公司违规信息披露的影响因素研究[J]. 审计研究, 2008,(1):75-81
[36] Agrawal A., Chadha S. Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 2005,48(2):371-406
[37] 陆瑶,朱玉杰,胡晓元. 机构投资者持股与上市公司违规行为的实证研究[J]. 南开管理评论, 2012, 15(1):13-23
[38] Peng L., Ell A. R. Executive Pay and Shareholder Litigation[J]. Review of Finance, 2008,12(1):141-184
[39] 陆瑶,胡江燕. CEO与董事间"老乡"关系对公司违规行为的影响研究[J]. 南开管理评论, 2016, 19(2):52-62
[40] 陆瑶,李茶. CEO对董事会的影响力与上市公司违规犯罪[J]. 金融研究, 2016,(1):176-191
[41] 权小锋,肖斌卿,尹洪英. 投资者关系管理能够抑制企业违规风险吗?——基于A股上市公司投资者关系管理的综合调查[J]. 财经研究, 2016,42(5):15-27
[42] Davidson R., Dey A., Smith A. Executives' "Off-The-Job" Behavior, Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2015,117(1):5-28
[43] Granovetter M. Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness[J]. American Journal of Sociology, 1985,91(3):481-510
[44] Uzzi B. Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks:The Paradox of Embeddedness[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1997,42(1):35-67
[45] Hambrick B. D., Mason P. A. Upper Echelons:Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers[J]. Academy Management Review, 1984,9(2):193-206
[46] DiMaggio P. Culture and Cognition[J]. Annual Review of Sociology, 1997,23(1):263-287
[47] Liu X. Corruption Culture and Corporate Misconduct[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2016,122(2):307-327
[48] Pfeffer J., Salancik G. The External Control of Organizations[M]. New York:Harper and Row, 1978
[49] 罗党论,刘晓龙. 政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J]. 管理世界, 2009,(5):97-106
[50] Gul F. A., Wu D., Yang Z. Do Individual Auditors Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from Archival Data[J]. The Accounting Review, 2013,88(6):1993-2023
[51] 许年行,江轩宇,伊志宏,等. 政治关联影响投资者法律保护的执法效率吗?[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2013,12(2):373-406
[52] Piotroski J. D., Roulstone D. T. The Influence of Analysts, Institutional Investors, and Insiders on the Incorporation of Market, Industry, and Firm-Specific Information into Stock Prices[J]. The Accounting Review, 2004,79(4):1119-1151
[53] Kaplan S. N., Zingales L. Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitives Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997,112(1):169-215
[54] Coval J. D., Moskowitz T. J. Home Bias at Home:Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1999,54(6):2045-2073
[55] Dechow P. M., Sloan R. G., Sweeney A. P. Detecting Earnings Management[J]. The Accounting Review, 1995,70(2):193-225
[56] Kothari S. P., Leone A., Wasley C. Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2005,39(1):163-197