创业投资引导基金补偿机制对创投机构网络位置的影响研究

›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (1): 107-118.

创业投资引导基金补偿机制对创投机构网络位置的影响研究

杨敏利^1,3, 丁文虎¹, 郭立宏², Marcus W. Feldman³

1. 西安理工大学经济与管理学院, 西安 710054;
2. 西北大学经济管理学院, 西安 710127;
3. 斯坦福大学莫里森人口与资源研究所, 加利福尼亚 94305

收稿日期:2018-01-08 出版日期:2020-01-28 发布日期:2020-01-19
通讯作者: 杨敏利(通讯作者),西安理工大学经济与管理学院副教授,斯坦福大学莫里森人口与资源研究所访问副教授,硕士生导师,博士
作者简介:丁文虎,西安理工大学经济与管理学院博士研究生;郭立宏,西北大学经济管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;Marcus W.Feldman,斯坦福大学莫里森人口与资源研究所教授,博士生导师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目（71702091）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目（17YJC630023）；教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目（15YJA630086）；陕西省社会科学基金项目（2017S032）。

The Impact of the Compensation Mechanism of GVCGFs on VC Firms' Network Position

Yang Minli^1,3, Ding Wenhu¹, Guo Lihong², Marcus W. Feldman³

1. School of Economics and Management, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710054;
2. School of Economics and Management, Northwest University, Xi'an 710127;
3. Morrison Institute for Population and Resource Studies, Stanford University, California 94305

Received:2018-01-08 Online:2020-01-28 Published:2020-01-19

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

随着创投市场的网络化趋势越来越突出，提升网络位置成为创投机构的重要竞争战略之一。论文基于激励视角研究创业投资引导基金（简称引导基金）补偿机制对创投机构网络位置的影响。通过私募通数据库搜集大样本数据构造匹配样本，使用双重差分模型，研究结论表明：（1）引导基金参股时为私人资本提供收益补偿、固定收益补偿、或者收益补偿加上固定收益补偿会提升创投机构的网络位置，为私人资本提供亏损补偿、亏损补偿加上固定收益补偿、或者亏损补偿加上收益补偿加上固定收益补偿则不会提升创投机构的网络位置；（2）相比于参股国有背景创投机构而言，引导基金参股非国有背景创投机构时提供收益补偿、固定收益补偿、或者收益补偿加上固定收益补偿对网络位置的提升作用更明显。论文拓宽了创投机构提升网络位置的战略选择，对引导基金主管部门选择补偿机制也有一定的参考意义。

关键词: 引导基金, 参股, 补偿机制, 创投机构, 网络位置

Abstract:

Networking has become an increasing trend in China's venture capital (VC) market, and promoting the network position may be an important way for venture capital firms to achieve competitive advantage. Based on the theoretical perspective of incentives, the im-pact of compensation mechanism of China's Government Venture Capital Guiding Funds(GVCGFs) on VC firms' network position is in-vestigated in the paper. These VC firms are funded by the government and act as limited partners to commit in VC funds. By constructing a large matching sample from the PEdata database and using a difference-in-differences model, it is found that the equity participation of GVCGFs may promote VC firms' network positions if they provide the private capital with revenue compensation, fixed-revenue compen-sation, or revenue compensation plus fixed-revenue compensation, but may not if there is loss compensation, loss compensation plus fixed-revenue compensation, or loss compensation plus revenue compensation plus fixed-revenue compensation. It is also found that the network position promoting effects are more significant for GVCGFs participating in non-state-backed VC firms than for those participating in state-backed ones. These results support the incentive hypothesis, expand our understanding of the government VCs and VC network, and support some recommendations for the GVCGFs' authorities to choose the compensation mechanism as well as a feasible strategy for VC firms to enhance their network position.

Key words: Government Venture Capital Guiding Fund, equity participation, compensation mechanism, venture capital firm, network po-sition

杨敏利, 丁文虎, 郭立宏, Marcus W. Feldman. 创业投资引导基金补偿机制对创投机构网络位置的影响研究[J]. , 2020, 32(1): 107-118.

Yang Minli, Ding Wenhu, Guo Lihong, Marcus W. Feldman. The Impact of the Compensation Mechanism of GVCGFs on VC Firms' Network Position[J]. , 2020, 32(1): 107-118.

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