股票卖空压力能否抑制高管的在职消费?——基于中国融资融券的自然实验证据

›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (1): 40-55.

股票卖空压力能否抑制高管的在职消费?——基于中国融资融券的自然实验证据

刘飞¹, 杜建华², Chao Bian³

1. 河南大学经济学院/河南大学金融与证券研究所, 开封 475004;
2. 河南大学商学院, 开封 475004;
3. University of Canterbury International College, Christchurch, New Zealand 8140

收稿日期:2017-04-18 出版日期:2020-01-28 发布日期:2020-01-19
通讯作者: 杜建华(通讯作者),河南大学商学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士
作者简介:刘飞,河南大学经济学院副教授,河南大学金融与证券研究所研究员,硕士生导师,博士;Chao Bian,University of Canterbury International College (UCIC)讲师,博士。
基金资助:
中国博士后科学基金面上项目（2016M592273）；中国博士后科学基金特别资助项目（2018T110720）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目（14YJCZH094；15YJCZH036）；河南省高等学校青年骨干教师培养计划（2016GGJS-026）。

Does Short Selling Pressure Discipline the Executive Perquisites: Evidence from a Nature Experiment on Margin Trading in China

Liu Fei¹, Du Jianhua², Chao Bian³

1. School of Economics/Research Institute of Finance, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004;
2. Business School, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004;
3. University of Canterbury International College, Christchurch, New Zealand 8140

Received:2017-04-18 Online:2020-01-28 Published:2020-01-19

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文检验中国资本市场融资融券制度所施加的股票卖空压力对企业高管在职消费的影响。以2007-2014年中国上市公司财务数据为样本，基于自然实验框架的双重差分模型进行检验，结果发现，允许卖空的上市公司，其高管在职消费水平与不能卖空的上市公司相比显著降低；进一步的研究则发现，股票卖空压力是通过缓解信息不对称程度和减少委托代理问题来抑制高管的在职消费。本文实证结果说明股票卖空对高管在职消费来说是一种潜在的外部治理机制。

关键词: 股票卖空, 在职消费, 融资融券, 抑制效应, 双重差分模型

Abstract:

This paper examines the effect of short selling pressure exerted under the securities margin trading system on the executive perquisites in China. Using the data of Chinese publicly-listed companies for the period 2007 to 2014, we test the effect with the differ-ence-in-differences model within the framework of natural experiment, and find that short selling pressure can discipline the executive perquisites and the level of executive perquisites decreases more significantly in the companies allowed for short selling. Further research shows that short selling pressure disciplines the executive perquisites by alleviating the degree of information asymmetry and reducing the principal-agent problem. This means that short selling is a kind of potential external governance mechanism for executive perquisites.

Key words: short selling, perquisites, margin trading, discipline effect, difference-in-differences model

刘飞, 杜建华, Chao Bian. 股票卖空压力能否抑制高管的在职消费?——基于中国融资融券的自然实验证据[J]. , 2020, 32(1): 40-55.

Liu Fei, Du Jianhua, Chao Bian. Does Short Selling Pressure Discipline the Executive Perquisites: Evidence from a Nature Experiment on Margin Trading in China[J]. , 2020, 32(1): 40-55.

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