管理评论

›› 2019, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (9): 266-277.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

限价与公益性下药品双渠道供应链权力结构模型

李诗杨1,2, 但斌1,2, 李红霞3, 张海月1,2   

  1. 1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400044;
    2. 重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室, 重庆 400044;
    3. 重庆理工大学管理学院, 重庆 400054
  • 收稿日期:2017-01-03 出版日期:2019-09-28 发布日期:2019-09-29
  • 作者简介:李诗杨,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院博士研究生;但斌,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授,博士生导师;李红霞,重庆理工大学管理学院副教授;张海月,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目（71572020；71272086）。

Power Structure for Pharmaceutical Dual-channel Supply Chain under Price Cap Policy and Public Welfare

Li Shiyang1,2, Dan Bin1,2, Li Hongxia3, Zhang Haiyue1,2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044;
    2. Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics at Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044;
    3. College of Management, Chongqing University of technology, Chongqing 400054
  • Received:2017-01-03 Online:2019-09-28 Published:2019-09-29

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摘要：

考虑限价政策和医疗机构公益性影响，分别构建了以医疗机构和药品供应商为主导的药品双渠道供应链权力结构模型，进而分析了医疗机构公益性、药品限价政策等的影响，最后通过两种权力结构的均衡结果对比，揭示了权力结构差异对供应链绩效和社会福利的影响。研究发现：医疗机构主导下，限价政策仅抑制医疗机构药品售价，而对网上渠道药价无影响；药品供应商主导下，限价政策可同时抑制两条渠道的药品价格。在限价约束下，当医疗机构主导时，降低最高限价可同时提高药品供应链利润和社会整体福利；而药品供应商主导下仅提高社会整体福利。当不受限价约束时，两种权力结构下，提高医疗机构公益性可以同时增加药品供应链利润和社会整体福利。相比于医疗机构主导情形，供应商主导下药品双渠道供应链价格较低，患者剩余较大，而供应链利润较小。

关键词: 药品供应链, 双渠道, 医疗机构公益性, 限价政策, 权力结构

Abstract:

Taking the price cap policy and the public welfare of medical institutions into consideration, we establish two Stackelberg game models, which are dominated by the medical institutions and pharmaceutical supplier respectively. Then we analyze the impacts of price cap policy and public welfare of medical institutions on the equilibriums. By comparing the equilibriums under two kinds of different power structures, we illustrate the impacts of different power constructs on supply chain performance and social welfare. The studies show that under the medical institutions dominated model, the price cap policy limits the medical institutions price, while has no impact on online price. Under the pharmaceutical supplier dominated model, the price cap policy limits both the online price and medical institutions price. Under the constraint of price cap, decreasing the price cap can improve both the supply chain profit and public welfare of medical institutions in the medical institution dominated model, while in the pharmaceutical supplier dominated model, decreasing the price cap can only improve the public welfare of medical institutions. Without the constraint of price cap, increasing public welfare of medical institutions not only increases the pharmaceutical supply chain profit, but also increases social welfare under two kinds of different dominated models. Comparing with the medical institutions dominated model, the pricing of pharmaceutical of medical institutions and supply chain profit are lower than those in the pharmaceutical supplier dominated model, while the patient's surplus is higher.

Key words: pharmaceutical, dual-channel supply chain, public welfare of medical institutions, price cap policy, power structure