激励视角下的PPP项目利益分配——以亚投行支撑中国企业投资GMS国家基础设施项目为例

›› 2018, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (11): 257-265.

激励视角下的PPP项目利益分配——以亚投行支撑中国企业投资GMS国家基础设施项目为例

常雅楠, 王松江

昆明理工大学管理与经济学院, 昆明 650093

收稿日期:2016-08-10 出版日期:2018-11-28 发布日期:2018-11-22
通讯作者: 王松江,昆明理工大学管理与经济学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
作者简介:常雅楠,昆明理工大学管理与经济学院硕士研究生
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目（70962003）。

Profit Allocation of PPP Project from the Perspective of Incentives——The Case of Chinese Enterprises' Investment in the Infrastructure Projects of GMS Countries under the Support of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Chang Yanan, Wang Songjiang

Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650093

Received:2016-08-10 Online:2018-11-28 Published:2018-11-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

科学公平的利益分配是PPP项目成功的关键因素之一。从激励视角分析，利益分配成为能有效解决公私双方不同利益诉求矛盾的激励措施之一。在考虑影响PPP项目利益分配因素的基础上，建立了改进的Shapley值法利益分配综合模型。通过分析亚投行支撑中国企业投资GMS国家基础设施项目，表明了该模型可以实现项目参与者利益最优分配。

关键词: PPP, 利益分配, Shapley, 亚投行, 激励

Abstract:

Scientific and fair assignment of profit is one of the key factors in the success of PPP projects. From the perspective of incentive, the distribution of benefits is an incentive measure that can effectively solve the contradiction between public and private sectors. The contradiction is generated by different interest demands between the public and the private sectors. In consideration of the factors that affect the distribution of PPP projects, this paper establishes the Modified Shapley Value Method. By analyzing the project Chinese enterprises' investment in the infrastructure projects of GMS countries under the support of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, it shows that the model can achieve the optimal profit assignment.

Key words: PPP, profit allocation, Shapley, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, incentives

常雅楠, 王松江. 激励视角下的PPP项目利益分配——以亚投行支撑中国企业投资GMS国家基础设施项目为例[J]. , 2018, 30(11): 257-265.

Chang Yanan, Wang Songjiang. Profit Allocation of PPP Project from the Perspective of Incentives——The Case of Chinese Enterprises' Investment in the Infrastructure Projects of GMS Countries under the Support of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank[J]. , 2018, 30(11): 257-265.

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