管理评论

›› 2018, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 82-96.

• 技术与创新管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

政府规制下新能源汽车产业发展的演化博弈分析

曹霞1, 邢泽宇1, 张路蓬2   

  1. 1. 哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院, 哈尔滨 150001;
    2. 清华大学公共管理学院, 北京 100084
  • 收稿日期:2016-05-25 出版日期:2018-09-28 发布日期:2018-09-29
  • 作者简介:曹霞,哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;邢泽宇,哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院博士研究生;张路蓬,清华大学公共管理学院博士后。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目（71473055）；国家社会科学基金项目（17BGL238）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目（HEUCFW170912）；国家博士后科学基金项目（2017M620814）。

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of New Energy Vehicle Industry Development under Government Regulations

Cao Xia1, Xing Zeyu1, Zhang Lupeng2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001;
    2. School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084
  • Received:2016-05-25 Online:2018-09-28 Published:2018-09-29

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摘要：

为应对节能减排的重大挑战，发展新能源汽车产业已成为国家重大需求与战略决策，而政策支持是促进新能源汽车产业发展的必要手段。运用演化博弈理论和matlab软件仿真分析政府规制对新能源汽车产业的影响。研究发现：（1）中强度的监管力度可以促进新能源汽车产业健康有序的发展，低强度的监管力度会打乱市场秩序，而高强度的监管力度则会抑制新能源汽车产业的发展。（2）政府对于汽车制造企业排放污染物的惩罚力度越大，越有利于企业向着生产新能源汽车的方向演化。（3）政府对企业生产新能源汽车予以技术和研发的资助，资助力度越大越有利于汽车制造企业克服技术壁垒、进行原创性突破，实现新能源汽车产业的规模化，并促进消费者积极购买。（4）政府基础设施建设投入力度较低时，消费者会选择不购买新能源汽车。当投入力度为适度和较高时，消费者会积极地购买新能源汽车，企业也会在政府规制和消费者购买行为的影响下，最终向选择生产新能源汽车的方向演化。

关键词: 政府规制, 新能源汽车产业, 演化博弈理论

Abstract:

To tackle the major challenges in energy conservation and emission reduction, developing new energy vehicle industry has be-come one of the great national demands and strategic decisions, in which policy support is the necessary measure to boost the automobile industry. This paper analyzes the effects of the government regulations on the new energy vehicle industry using the evolutionary game theory and matlab simulation. The results obtained are summarized as follows. (1)The moderate intensive supervision under the government promotes the healthy and orderly development of new energy automotive industry, and high intensive supervision disturbs the market order, while high intensive supervision curbs the development of new energy automotive industry. (2) The more severe penalties of the government against pollutant emission from the automakers will urge them to develop the new energy vehicles. (3) The sufficient assistance of the government to the manufacturers of the new energy vehicles will help them overcome the technology barriers, conduct the original breakthrough, realize the mass production of new energy vehicles, and promote consumers' active purchasing. (4) When the government invests less in the infrastructure construction, consumers will not choose to purchase the new energy vehicles. However, mod-erate or higher investment will encourage consumers to purchase new energy vehicles, as a result of which automakers will eventually switch to new energy vehicles in response to the government's effective regulations and consumers' purchasing behaviors.

Key words: government regulations, new energy vehicle industry, evolutionary game theory