公司治理模式重构与控制权争夺——基于万科“控制权之争”的案例研究

›› 2018, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (8): 275-289.

公司治理模式重构与控制权争夺——基于万科“控制权之争”的案例研究

张华¹, 胡海川^2,3, 卢颖¹

1. 哈尔滨工业大学(威海)经济管理学院, 威海 264209;
2. 哈尔滨工业大学经济与管理学院, 哈尔滨 150001;
3. 日照职业技术学院, 日照 276800

收稿日期:2017-08-23 出版日期:2018-08-28 发布日期:2018-08-31
通讯作者: 卢颖(通讯作者),哈尔滨工业大学(威海)经济管理学院硕士研究生
作者简介:张华,哈尔滨工业大学(威海)经济管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士;胡海川,哈尔滨工业大学经济与管理学院博士研究生,日照职业技术学院讲师。

Reconstruction of Corporate Governance Model and Control Rights Fighting: A Case Study Based on Battle for Control of Vanke

Zhang Hua¹, Hu Haichuan^2,3, Lu Ying¹

1. School of Economics and Management, Harbin Institute of Technology(Weihai), Weihai 264209;
2. School of Economics and Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001;
3. Rizhao Polytechnic, Rizhao 276800

Received:2017-08-23 Online:2018-08-28 Published:2018-08-31

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文以万科"控制权之争"案例为背景，研究了从"股东大会中心主义"向"董事会中心主义"公司治理模式重构过程中，控制权配置状态的变化对公司控制权争夺的影响。分析了公司治理模式重构前后控制权争夺动因、路径以及障碍的差异，提出了"董事会中心主义"公司治理模式下管理层控制权维护与股东利益保护的路径和方法。本文研究认为公司治理模式的重构源于股权结构的分散和所有权与经营权的分离，以及人力资本和物质资本在公司价值创造中角色的转变。公司控制权配置状态的变化造成了公司控制权的不稳定性，是引发公司控制权争夺的动因。"董事会中心主义"公司治理模式下公司管理层人力资本的专用性以及管理层与股东之间和谐共生的利益关系是控制权争夺的主要障碍；进行管理层专用性人力资本投资、构建"双重股权结构"以及实行"合伙人制度"是防范控制权风险的有效手段；对管理层进行股权激励并充分发挥独立董事、外部董事的监督制约作用是保持公司控制权稳定，保护股东利益的有效措施。

关键词: 股东大会中心主义, 董事会中心主义, 公司治理模式, 控制权争夺

Abstract:

In this paper, the author takes the case:‘battle for control’ of Vanke as the background, studies on the influence of the change of the state of control right allocation on the battle for corporate control in the process of corporate governance model reconstruction from the "Shareholder centralism" to the "board centralism". This paper analyzes the differences in the forms, paths and obstacles of the control battle before and after the reconstruction of the corporate governance model, and puts forward the paths and methods of the management control maintenance and the protection of the shareholders'interests under the corporate governance model of "board centrality". This paper considers that the reconstruction of corporate governance model is derived from the decentralization of ownership structure and the separation of ownership and management rights, as well as the roles transition of human capital and material capital in the value creation process. Changes in the state of control right allocation contribute to the instability of the control of the company, which is the driving force for the control battle of the company. Under the "board-centralism" corporate governance model, the specificity of human capital management and the harmonious relationship between management and shareholders is the main obstacle to the control battle; specific human capital investment of the management and the construction of dual ownership structure, as well as the implementation of the "partner system" are effective means to prevent the risk of control; To conduct equity incentives for the management of and give full play to the supervision of independent directors and outside directors are effective measures to maintain the stability of the company control and protect the interests of shareholders.

Key words: shareholder centralism, board centralism, corporate governance model, battle for control

张华, 胡海川, 卢颖. 公司治理模式重构与控制权争夺——基于万科“控制权之争”的案例研究[J]. , 2018, 30(8): 275-289.

Zhang Hua, Hu Haichuan, Lu Ying. Reconstruction of Corporate Governance Model and Control Rights Fighting: A Case Study Based on Battle for Control of Vanke[J]. , 2018, 30(8): 275-289.

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