产业转移对地方环境规制影响的理论模型和经验验证——基于我国产业转移的实证检验

›› 2018, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (8): 32-42.

产业转移对地方环境规制影响的理论模型和经验验证——基于我国产业转移的实证检验

刘满凤¹, 李昕耀²

1. 江西财经大学协同创新中心, 南昌 330013;
2. 江西财经大学产业经济研究院, 南昌 330013

收稿日期:2017-09-25 出版日期:2018-08-28 发布日期:2018-08-31
作者简介:刘满凤,江西财经大学信息管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;李昕耀,江西财经大学硕士。
基金资助:
国家社科基金重大招标项目（15ZDC021）；国家自然科学基金项目（71764007；71263020）；江西省科技落地计划项目（KJLD12064）；江西省高校哲学社会科学重大招标项目（ZDGG201305）。

A Theory Model and Empirical Validation in Relation to the Influence that Industrial Transfer may Have on Local Environment Regulation——Based on Empirical Tests of China's Industrial Transfer

Liu Manfeng¹, Li Xinyao²

1. Collaborative Innovation Center, Jiangxi University of Finance & Economics, Nanchang 330013;
2. School of Industrial Economics, Jiangxi University of Finance & Economics, Nanchang 330013

Received:2017-09-25 Online:2018-08-28 Published:2018-08-31

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文首先建立了一个包含本地政府、外地厂商、本地厂商和消费者的动态完全信息博弈模型，通过求解其纳什均衡结果表明：产业转移对环境规制的负面影响取决于本地政府的腐败程度，腐败程度越高的地区，产业转移对环境规制的负面影响越显著；然后，利用1992-2014年的省际面板数据对以上理论进行了验证，实证结果与理论模型的预期基本一致。因此，政府在政策制定时应注意到产业转移对环境规制的负面影响，即产业转移对环境规制的逆向作用，尤其是在高腐败地区，这一效应更应该得到高度重视。

关键词: 产业转移, 腐败, 纳什均衡, 污染

Abstract:

First, a perfect information dynamic game that involves local manufacturers, foreign manufacturers, local government and consumers is set up to study the effect of industrial transfer on local environment regulation, and then by solving the Nash equilibrium, we reach the conclusion that negative effect of industrial transfer on local environmental regulation depends on the corruptibility of local government, namely the more corrupted the local government is, the more negative effect that industrial transfer will have on local environment regulation. In empirical analysis, this paper adopts a province-level panel data model including data from 1992 to 2014 to test this conclusion, and the regression result proves to be consistent with the theoretical model. Therefore, when setting environment regulation policies or industrial transfer policies, the government should pay more attention to negative effects or adverse effects that industrial transfer may have on environment regulation, especially in highly corruptive regions.

Key words: industrial transfer, corruption, Nash equilibrium, pollution

刘满凤, 李昕耀. 产业转移对地方环境规制影响的理论模型和经验验证——基于我国产业转移的实证检验[J]. , 2018, 30(8): 32-42.

Liu Manfeng, Li Xinyao. A Theory Model and Empirical Validation in Relation to the Influence that Industrial Transfer may Have on Local Environment Regulation——Based on Empirical Tests of China's Industrial Transfer[J]. , 2018, 30(8): 32-42.

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