反收购条款与投资者保护：理论模型与实证检验

›› 2018, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (7): 191-206.

反收购条款与投资者保护：理论模型与实证检验

许金花¹, 李善民², 张东³, 陈玉罡²

1. 广东工业大学管理学院, 广州 510520;
2. 中山大学管理学院, 广州 510275;
3. 中山大学社会学与人类学学院, 广州 510275

收稿日期:2016-09-12 出版日期:2018-07-28 发布日期:2018-07-21
通讯作者: 许金花(通讯作者),广东工业大学管理学院讲师,博士
作者简介:李善民,中山大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;张东,中山大学社会学与人类学学院博士研究生;陈玉罡,中山大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
基金资助:
广东省哲学社会科学"十三五"规划青年项目（GD16YYJ04）；国家自然科学基金资助项目（71702036；71372149）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金（17YJC790182）；广州市哲学社会科学"十三五"规划项目（2018GZQN29）。

Anti-takeover Provisions and Investor Protection: Theoretical Model and Empirical Research

Xu Jinhua¹, Li Shanmin², Zhang Dong³, Chen Yugang²

1. School of Management, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520;
2. Busines School, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275;
3. School of Sociology And Anthropology, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275

Received:2016-09-12 Online:2018-07-28 Published:2018-07-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

2006年《上市公司章程指引》的修订是中国公司治理制度的重要变革，这一旨在加大公司章程自治空间的制度变革为研究公司章程自治的有效性提供了契机。本文从公司章程中设立反收购条款的角度，以股权高度集中条件下的大股东利益侵占为出发点，构建理论模型，基于我国A股上市公司章程条款的设立数据，实证检验了反收购条款与投资者保护的关系。研究结果表明，反收购条款的设立在实践中发挥了投资者保护作用；进一步研究发现，法律监管和外部审计作为公司外部治理机制，与章程条款的内部治理之间表现出一定程度的替代效应。在法律监督较差和外部审计质量较低的环境下，反收购条款对掏空的抑制作用更强，公司章程条款的内部治理效应也更大。

关键词: 反收购条款, 投资者保护, 公司章程

Abstract:

The revision of "Guidelines on the Articles of Association of Listed Companies" in 2006 for the purpose of increase the autonomy of the articles of association is an important change in China's corporate governance system. The revision also provides an opportunity to study the effectiveness of the autonomy of articles of association. From the perspective of anti-takeover provisions of the articles of association, by factoring in the unique tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders in China to create a theoretical model, then based on data derived from China's A-share listed companies, our empirical studies examine the relationship between three typical anti-takeover provisions and investor protection. Results indicate that the establishment of anti-takeover provisions are conducive to a reduction in tunnelling by the controlling shareholder. Furthermore, it also plays an important role in protecting investors in the area of corporate governance within China. Further research finds that legal supervision and external audit, as two important external corporate governance mechanisms, show a certain degree of substitution effects between internal governance. In an environment of poorer legal supervision and lower external audit quality, the reduction in tunneling by anti-takeover provisions and the effect of internal governance is greater.

Key words: anti-takeover provisions, investor protection, articles of association of listed companies

许金花, 李善民, 张东, 陈玉罡. 反收购条款与投资者保护：理论模型与实证检验[J]. , 2018, 30(7): 191-206.

Xu Jinhua, Li Shanmin, Zhang Dong, Chen Yugang. Anti-takeover Provisions and Investor Protection: Theoretical Model and Empirical Research[J]. , 2018, 30(7): 191-206.

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