›› 2018, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (6): 212-226.

• 会计与财务管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

并购双重定价安排、声誉约束与利益输送

翟进步   

  1. 中央财经大学财政税务学院, 北京 100081
  • 收稿日期:2017-03-07 出版日期:2018-06-28 发布日期:2018-06-25
  • 作者简介:翟进步,中央财经大学财政税务学院副教授,博士。
  • 基金资助:

    教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(17YJA630128);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金和中央财经大学青年科研创新团队支持计划项目(KY2016033);中财-鹏元地方财政投融资研究所项目(ZP201401)。

Double Pricing Institution, Reputation Constraint and Interest Transfer in M&As

Zhai Jinbu   

  1. Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081
  • Received:2017-03-07 Online:2018-06-28 Published:2018-06-25

摘要:

上市公司以定向增发方式并购资产是资本市场关注的重点和焦点,但倍受市场诟病和质疑的是该行为中存在利益输送现象,而交易中所涉及两笔资产的双重定价公允性是其核心问题。相比于提高增发股份股票折价率,通过操纵所收购资产评估价值、以较高资产估值增值率进行利益输送的方式则更为隐蔽。本文以2006-2014年期间发生的上市公司通过定向增发方式购买资产的223例重大资产重组事件为研究对象,从标的资产评估价值增值和定增股份折价的结合角度,研究这种双重定价安排下的更复杂的上市公司利益输送行为。研究发现,高估值增值率与高增发折价率在定增并购中相伴而存,这加剧了上市公司向大股东进行利益输送的程度,而资产评估行业内部的声誉约束机制有利于抑制资产高估值从而减轻利益输送程度。实践启示在于声誉约束机制是提升重大资产重组中资产估值和定价公允性、减轻利益输送的有效途径,尤其对于声誉约束比较弱的资产评估机构,行业协会和行政管理部门应通过完善其投诉和举报机制、及时向社会公开资产评估机构的信用信息和处罚信息等措施以提升会员执业质量,这也为新近通过的《资产评估法》中有关行业协会和行政管理部门职责的更好落实和履行提供了有力证据。

关键词: 定向增发, 购买资产, 双重定价, 声誉约束, 利益输送

Abstract:

Issuing additional stocks to certain buyers is a questionable way to acquire assets in China's capital market because it may involve interest transfer from large shareholders or new dominating stockholders, depending on whether the two kinds of assets are fairly priced in the trade under the unsymmetrical pricing institution in China. Relative to the distinctness and directness of higher discounted stock price in additional stock issuances, the mode of interest transfer by higher valuation in asset appraisal is more indistinct. Using 223 major asset reorganization samples with executing mergers & acquisition by way of issuing additional stocks to some certain buyers between 2006 and 2014, the paper studies more complicated interest transfer actions under combined considerations of asset appraisals increment and discounted stock price. We find that higher asset appraisal increment and discounted stock price coexist in the type of M&As. The results show that the double pricing institution probably will intensify level of interest transfer in M&As. Deep research gives us evidence that reputation constraint existing in asset appraisal firms could alleviate the problem of interest transfer in M&As. At last, we provide some constructive suggestions to regulatory authorities including China Appraisal Society and China Securities Regulatory Commission.

Key words: issuing additional stocks to certain buyers, mergers &, acquisition, double pricing institution, reputation constraint, interest transfer