管理评论 ›› 2026, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (2): 121-134.

• 创新与创业管理 • 上一篇    

“双随机、一公开”环境监管制度与企业绿色创新

王江寒, 钟海燕, 林枫, 费佳宝   

  1. 三峡大学经济与管理学院, 宜昌 443002
  • 收稿日期:2023-09-26 发布日期:2026-03-13
  • 作者简介:王江寒,三峡大学经济与管理学院博士研究生;钟海燕(通讯作者),三峡大学经济与管理学院副教授,博士生导师,博士;林枫,三峡大学经济与管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士;费佳宝,三峡大学经济与管理学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402082);德阳市哲学社会科学研究“十四五”规划项目(DY24C023)。

The Environmental Supervision System of “Double Random and One Open” and Corporate Green Innovation

Wang Jianghan, Zhong Haiyan, Lin Feng, Fei Jiabao   

  1. College of Economics and Management, China Three Gorges University, Yichang 443002
  • Received:2023-09-26 Published:2026-03-13

摘要: “双随机、一公开”环境监管制度是我国规范政府环境执法行为的一项重要创新举措。本文基于2009—2022年A股非金融类上市公司的绿色专利数据,采用双重差分法考察了该制度对企业绿色创新的影响。结果表明:①相较于未被随机抽查的企业,该制度显著促进了被环保部门随机抽查企业的绿色创新水平。②该制度主要促进了企业的策略性绿色创新,对实质性绿色创新的影响不明显,存在“重数量、轻质量”的现象。③机制分析结果显示,该制度通过增强政府环境执法力度和改善企业环境信息透明度两个渠道驱动企业加强绿色创新,分别体现了规制压力效应和信息治理效应。④纠偏治理探讨发现,多次抽查、环保补助和绿色信贷有助于抑制该制度对企业绿色创新存在的扭曲性影响,推动企业提高绿色创新质量。⑤经济后果检验方面,从短期来看,该制度对企业绿色创新的促进作用不利于提升企业经济绩效,采取实质性绿色创新显著降低了企业经济绩效;从长期来看,该制度通过推动企业加强绿色创新,显著改善了企业经济绩效,但对采取策略性绿色创新的企业经济绩效的影响不明显。

关键词: “双随机、一公开”, 环境监管, 策略性绿色创新, 实质性绿色创新, 经济绩效

Abstract: The environmental supervision system of “double random and one open” is an important innovation measure in regulating the government’s environmental enforcement behavior in China. Based on the green patent data of China’s A-share listed non-financial firms from 2009 to 2022, this paper employs the difference-in-differences approach to investigate the impact of this system on corporate green innovation. The results show that: (1) compared with the enterprises that have not been randomly checked, this system significantly promotes the green innovation level of the enterprises that have been randomly checked by the environmental protection departments; (2) this system mainly promotes the strategic green innovation of enterprises rather than the substantive green innovation, that is, there is a phenomenon of “emphasizing quantity over quality”; (3) the mechanism analysis results show that this system can drive enterprises to strengthen green innovation through enhancing government environmental enforcement and improving corporate environmental information transparency, reflecting the regulatory pressure effect and the information governance effect respectively; (4) the correction discussion finds that repeatedly random checks, environmental protection subsidies and green credit can help to alleviate the distorting impact of this system on corporate green innovation, thereby effectively promoting enterprises to improve the quality of green innovation; and (5) the economic consequence test suggests that in the short term, the promoting effect of this system on green innovation can not improve the economic performance of enterprises, and adopting the substantive green innovation will significantly reduce corporate economic performance. In the long run, this system can significantly improve the economic performance of enterprises by promoting enterprises to strengthen green innovation, but the impact on the adoption of strategic green innovation is not obvious.

Key words: “double random and one open”, environmental regulation, strategic green innovation, substantive green innovation, economic performance