管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2026, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (10): 49-64.

• 经济与金融管理 • 上一篇    

“央-地-企-农”视角下农业再生水减污降碳策略演化分析

刘新宇1, 陈军飞1,2,3, 丁童慧4, 邓梦华1, 朱安琪5   

  1. 1. 河海大学商学院, 南京 211100;
    2. 长江保护与绿色发展研究院, 南京 210098;
    3. 江苏长江保护与高质量发展研究基地, 南京 210098;
    4. 河海大学经济与金融学院, 常州 213200;
    5. 中国科学技术大学管理学院, 合肥 230026
  • 收稿日期:2024-12-17 发布日期:2026-11-14
  • 作者简介:刘新宇，河海大学商学院博士研究生；陈军飞（通讯作者），河海大学商学院教授，博士生导师，博士；丁童慧，河海大学经济与金融学院讲师，博士；邓梦华，河海大学商学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士；朱安琪，中国科学技术大学管理学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目（42071278）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项（B240207033；B240207117）。

Evolutionary Analysis of Pollution and Carbon Reduction Strategies for Agricultural Reclaimed Water from the Perspective of Central-Local-Firms-Farmers

Liu Xinyu1, Chen Junfei1,2,3, Ding Tonghui4, Deng Menghua1, Zhu Anqi5   

  1. 1. Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100;
    2. Yangtze Institute for Conservation and Development, Nanjing 210098;
    3. Jiangsu Research Base of Yangtze Institute for Conservation and High-quality Development, Nanjing 210098;
    4. School of Economics and Finance, Hohai University, Changzhou 213200;
    5. School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026
  • Received:2024-12-17 Published:2026-11-14

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摘要： 农业再生水减污降碳是实现农业可持续发展的重要途径之一。本文从“央-地-企-农”视角出发，首先，基于农户异质性构建Hotelling模型分析农业再生水企业市场竞争。基于此，构建有/无中央政府引导的企业和地方政府演化博弈模型，探究多主体策略互动规律，并开展案例与仿真分析。结果表明：满足阈值条件时，改善农户信任程度和可持续发展观念以及提升初始支付意愿有利于促进农业再生水减污降碳；减污降碳成本在可行区间内，中央政府的引导才能发挥作用；正向激励政策可提高企业和地方政府选择理想策略的意愿，仅地方政府监管无法使得农业再生水减污降碳达到理想状态，央地联动监管可改善此状态，且中央政府监管力度为中等即可产生效果；在不同策略组合中，执行正向激励和央地联动监管组合政策效果最优。本文为农业再生水减污降碳的多主体协同治理与政策优化提供了理论依据和决策参考。

关键词: 农业再生水, 农户异质性, 减污降碳, 央地联动, 策略演化

Abstract: Pollution and carbon reduction for agricultural reclaimed water is an effective tool for the sustainable development of agriculture. From the integration of four perspectives of central, local, firms, and farmers, this paper first constructs a Hotelling model based on the farmers’ heterogeneity to analyze the market competition of agricultural reclaimed water firms. Based on this, evolutionary game models of firms and local governments with or without the guidance of the central government are constructed to explore the strategic interaction rules among multi-agents. Further, case study and simulation analyses are also carried out to prove its feasibility and validation. The results show that when the threshold conditions are satisfied, inspiring farmers’ trust on the initiative, awareness of sustainable development, and initial willingness to pay contributes to promoting the pollution and carbon reduction for agricultural reclaimed water. Only when the cost of pollution and carbon reduction is within the feasible interval can the guidance of the central government play its role. Moreover, positive incentive policy can increase the willingness of firms and local governments to choose ideal strategies. Merely relying on the supervision of local governments cannot enable the pollution and carbon reduction for agricultural reclaimed water to reach an ideal state. Joint supervision by both the central government and local governments can achieve a good result, and a moderate supervision intensity of the central government will work. Among different policy combinations, the implementation of the combined policy of positive incentives and the central-local linkage supervision shows the best effect. This study provides a theoretical basis and decision-making support for multi-agent collaborative governance and policy optimization to promote pollution and carbon reduction in agricultural reclaimed water use.

Key words: agricultural reclaimed water, farmers’ heterogeneity, pollution and carbon reduction, central-local linkage, strategy evolution