“双管齐下”还是“背道而驰”：银行负债结构下债权人的市场约束选择——基于存款保险制度实施的准自然实验

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 存款保险制度实施后银行不同负债来源债权人的市场约束会产生何种变化？存款人和非存款债权人会“双管齐下”共同增强市场约束，还是会“背道而驰”？基于这些问题，本文利用2009—2020年186家商业银行的面板数据，构建2015年中国实施存款保险制度的双重差分模型。研究发现，存款保险制度实施后存款人加强了市场约束，非存款债权人在利益驱使下却放松了市场约束，与存款人背道而驰。存款保险制度的风险差别费率定价模式能够促进银行信息披露，从而影响市场约束；债权人市场约束的主要动机为防范风险，并通过价格约束的方式调整收益。在银行负债结构中，长期存款、债券负债、次级负债人的市场约束受到存款保险制度的影响较为显著。存款人与非存款债权人之间并不存在明显的市场约束互动；外部资本监管约束会降低存款保险制度对存款人市场约束的增强作用，弥补存款保险制度对非存款债权人市场约束的削弱；存款保险制度对市场约束的影响与对风险的影响趋势保持一致，说明存款保险制度下市场约束的风险缓释作用提升。

关键词: 存款保险制度, 存款人, 非存款债权人, 市场约束

Abstract: How will the market discipline of creditors with different sources of bank liabilities change after the implementation of a deposit insurance system? Will depositors and non-depository creditors work together to enhance market discipline, or will they work in the opposite direction? Based on this question, this paper utilizes the panel data of 186 commercial banks from 2009 to 2020 to construct a double-difference model for the implementation of the deposit insurance system in China in 2015. It is found that after the implementation of the deposit insurance system, depositors strengthened the market discipline, while non-deposit creditors relaxed the market discipline driven by interests, which is contrary to depositors. The risk-differentiated rate pricing model of the deposit insurance system promotes bank disclosure and thus influences market discipline; the main motivation for creditors’ market discipline is to guard against risk and adjust returns by means of price discipline. In the structure of bank liabilities, the market discipline of long-term deposits, bond liabilities, and subordinated liabilities holders are more significantly affected by the deposit insurance system. There is no significant market constraint interaction between depositors and non-deposit creditors. In addition, external capital regulatory discipline reduce the enhancing effect of the deposit insurance system on depositors’ market discipline and compensate for the weakening of the deposit insurance system on non-deposit creditors’ market discipline. The effect of deposit insurance on market discipline follows the same trend as the effect on risk, suggesting that the risk-mitigating effect of market discipline is enhanced under the deposit insurance system.

Key words: deposit insurance system, depositors, non-deposit creditors, market discipline

丁鑫, 周晔. “双管齐下”还是“背道而驰”：银行负债结构下债权人的市场约束选择——基于存款保险制度实施的准自然实验[J]. 管理评论, 2025, 37(8): 40-54.

Ding Xin, Zhou Ye. “Two-pronged” or “Back-pronged”: Market-discipline Options for Creditors under Bank Liability Structure—A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Implementation of a Deposit Insurance System[J]. Management Review, 2025, 37(8): 40-54.

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