管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (8): 27-39.

• 经济与金融管理 • 上一篇    

撤县设区与地方政府债务融资决策:基于管理体制转变的视角

杨超1, 樊纲治2, 张毅1   

  1. 1. 江西财经大学金融学院, 南昌 330013;
    2. 北京师范大学-香港浸会大学联合国际学院工商管理学院, 珠海 519087
  • 收稿日期:2022-04-25 发布日期:2025-09-09
  • 作者简介:杨超,江西财经大学金融学院副教授,博士;樊纲治,北京师范大学-香港浸会大学联合国际学院工商管理学院副教授,博士;张毅,江西财经大学金融学院硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目(71703062)。

County-to-District Reform and Financing Decisions of Local Debt: A Perspective on Management System Transformation

Yang Chao1, Fan Gangzhi2, Zhang Yi1   

  1. 1. School of Finance, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013;
    2. School of Business and Management, Beijing Normal University-Hong Kong Baptist University United International College, Zhuhai 519087
  • Received:2022-04-25 Published:2025-09-09

摘要: 本文基于被撤并县级政府管理体制转变的视角,利用DID模型研究撤县设区对于地方政府债务融资决策的影响及其作用机制。研究结果表明:撤县设区显著增加了地方政府的城投债发行规模,推高了城投债的发行成本和债务风险。机制研究发现,撤县设区会转变被撤并县级政府的管理体制,一方面,增加了新区固定资产投资和基建类城投债发行规模;另一方面,提升了新区的土地交易数量和土地出让收入,验证了撤县设区发行城投债的投资需求效应和土地收入效应,且前者发挥更大的作用。本文还发现,随着时间的推移,撤县设区对城投债规模的正向影响逐渐增大。此外,本文通过差异性检验发现,撤县设区对城投债的影响在西部地区、财政压力较小、经济增长压力较大以及没有发生官员变更的城市更为显著。最后,利用一系列的稳健性检验进一步证实了本文的基本结论。本文检验了撤县设区对于新区投资和土地出让的影响,进而验证了对地方政府债务融资的作用机制,拓展了撤县设区的研究。

关键词: 撤县设区, 土地融资, 地方政府债务融资, 城投债

Abstract: Based on the transformation of the management system in merged county government, this paper uses the DID model to examine the impact of the county-to-district reform on government debt and its underlying mechanism. Our study shows that the county-to-district reform increases the scale, cost and risk of municipal investment bonds. Channel tests reveal that the reform boosts the fixed asset investment in the new districts and city-level infrastructure-related municipal investment bond. Additionally, the reform stimulates the land transactions and land revenue in these new districts, confirming the investment demand effect and land income effect. We also find that the impact of the county-to-district reform on municipal investment bonds increases over time. Further analysis shows that this impact is more significant in western regions and in cities facing lower fiscal pressure, greater economic growth challenges and no official turnover. Finally, a series of robust tests further support the main conclusions of the study. Overall, this paper verifies how management system changes driven by county-to-district reform influence investment in new districts and land transfers, subsequently affecting local government debt. It verifies the mechanism behind the reform and broadens the scope of existing research.

Key words: county-to-district reform, land financing, local government debt, municipal investment bond